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CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION FOR A
NEW YORK CLOSE CORPORATION:
A FORM
ROBERT A. KESSLER*
4 ']EXVER rely on a form!" Lawyers are often given this advice, and
± N it is good advice. No form can be blindly copied. The lawyer must
draft papers for his clients which will be tailor-made to fit their needs.
Just as any sensible lawyer recognizes this, he also knows that forms
can be of immense help in this task of individual tailoring. At best he
may find one, after a long enough search, which will almost exactly fit
the needs of his client. At worst, forms suggest matters which the
lawyer might not have thought of before but which his document should
cover to meet the needs of his client. He may even find a paragraph
or a few phrases which he can copy off exactly. It is primarily with this
hope of "jogging" the lawyer's imagination, and, perhaps, of supplying
at least a few appropriate words that this form is offered.
The form certificate which follows has been drawn up primarily for
the close corporation which the ordinary practitioner is most likely to
encounter: one which starts off with ten or less shareholders, as a small
venture, to which all of the shareholders will devote all of their business
time, and from which they hope to derive all (or almost all) of their
income, and as a result of the successful operations of which they hope
to leave their widows as "well-fixed" as possible. Obviously, even within
such a conspect great leeway is possible.
As with any other document involving more than one party, the struc-
ture of a close corporation (which will, of course, be determined by its
certificate of incorporation and by-laws) will depend on two factors:
the relative bargaining positions of the parties involved, and the sagacity
of their respective lawyers (or the clients themselves, since in business
matters they are often more adept than their counsel).
Thus, in a corporation in which one participant is to put up more than
half of the assets, he may want-and the other shareholder(s) may be
willing to accede to his demand-complete control. In such a case, the
lawyer may rely on the simplest form certificate of incorporation and
by-laws. He may buy them already printed and simply fill in the blanks.
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; member of the NXer Jer-ey
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Oddly enough, as a result of accommodations in the statute, the lawyer
for a one man corporation will also be able to rely on a printed certificate,
although he will probably want to make a number of changes in the form
corporate by-laws.
For most close corporations involving two or more participants, the
form by-laws are inadequate, i.e., they must be drastically amended, and
although a printed certificate may be used, a significant number of
additions must be made. One reason is that often, although their finan-
cial contributions are unequal, minority participants will be unwilling
to accept the simple plutocracy which is the ideal of most corporation
statutes. Thus, e.g., one participant may be contributing a patent or
"know-how," 1 difficult to evaluate in monetary terms, but the exploita-
tion of which is the very raison d'etre for the venture. Even though the
other shareholders are contributing more cash, he may be unwilling to
accept the ordinary "money-talks" arrangement, and the people who
have only money to offer may also be willing to go along with him on
this. In such a case, or, in fact, in any situation where a control arrange-
ment other than one in which all power is given to the person who hap-
pens to contribute more than one-half of the financial capital is desired,
careful drafting is necessary.
Drafting of any instrument where more than one party is involved
represents the result of negotiation. This is, of course, also true of
incorporation papers, at least where each party is represented by his
own attorney. To a certain extent then, the drafting of these documents
will be the result of an Hegelian synthesis between two opposing posi-
tions. It is, of course, always possible for the lawyer for one party, e.g.,
the principal financial interest, to insist on the complete control for his
side that the ordinary corporate setup would give, while the minority
party's attorney is equally intransigent in his insistence upon an abso-
lute veto over all corporate decisions. If each drafts papers in accordance
with what he regards as the ideal for his side, a great deal of time and
effort will ordinarily be wasted as a result. Clauses giving an undue
advantage to one side will be stricken by the other, redrafted by the
first, "corrected" again by the other, and after a number of acrimonious
sessions, unless the entire deal falls through-possibly with the loss of
their respective clients by both lawyers-documents protecting the rea-
sonable demands of both sides will finally be hammered out midway
between the two extreme positions. Many lawyers operate in this manner.
Many things can be said in favor of this technique. Sometimes, for
1. See, e.g., Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 342 Il1. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1951); Clark
v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
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the reasons already suggested, even an extreme position will win out.
Furthermore, you never get more than you ask for initially, and unless
a lawyer has "way-out" demands that he is willing to trade, he may get
considerably less. On the other hand, unless the opposing lawyer's client
is extremely eager for the deal, it is usually a better policy to start
with demands which are not too extreme, ones which are closer to those
which can be accepted by both sides, i.e., give reasonable protection to
the vital interests of both.
This position seems especially advisable in drafting incorporation
papers, since often the various participants will not be represented by
separate counsel, but will all come to one lawyer to accomplish the task
of launching their corporate venture.2
The attempt has been made, therefore, in the following form to set
up an arrangement which will approximate this golden mean. At the
same time, the attempt has also been made to keep the provisions suffi-
ciently flexible to allow for differences in non-vital matters depending
on relative bargaining position.
When once a control and financial setup has been arranged, whatever
form it takes, it is essential that no participant be able to "pull out,"
to the disadvantage of the other parties. The certificate has, therefore,
also been planned to "freeze" whatever structure has been finally agreed
upon so that it cannot be changed without the consent of all parties
concerned. This is another one of the postulates on which the certificate
is drafted. As an illustration of these principles, the high vote provisions
of Articles 6 and 8 can be considered.
It is possible under the New York Business Corporation Law, as it
was under the old law, to give a minority shareholder a control over all
corporate decisions equal to that of the combined force of the majority,
i.e., a veto. This, of course, requires such equal control on both the
shareholder and director level, where both of these organs are left with
their customary powers. Thus, a provision under section 616 requiring
shareholder unanimity, and one under section 709 requiring director
unanimity, for the transaction of any business on either level can be
used to give such complete control over the corporation to a minority
participant as is given to the combined total of the other participants,
by the simple expedient of placing appropriate language in the certificate
of incorporation. However, since a veto over all corporate action gives
such great power to the minority, and correspondingly increases the
2. Although often done, such a procedure seems improper unless full diclosure of the
potential conflict and consent of all parties is secured. ABA, Canons of Professional Ethics
Canon 6.
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probability of a deadlock (the only resolution for which may be dissolu-
tion, an undesirable denouement), a list of fundamental matters on
which the majority may be willing to yield a veto, without placing itself
completely at the mercy of the minority, but still guaranteeing sufficient
protection to the latter from oppression, has been set forth. Of course,
as indicated above, where the minority's bargaining position is sufficient,
it may extract a veto over all corporate action, to grant which the form
can easily be modified. The form also accommodates itself to a middle
position whereby more than a mere majority, but less than all, of the
shareholders must approve corporate action even though such action
does not have the effect of altering the fundamental arrangement. Thus,
in a corporation with five equal shareholders, all parties might be
willing to allow a decision to be made by four of the five, but not
want to be bound by a decision by merely three of the five. 8
Unless the functions of the board are displaced,4 it is obvious that in
order to "freeze" the control arrangement it is also necessary to guarantee
the minority holders a place on the board of directors. This guarantee
involves two facets: insuring a minority participant's election to the
board, and protecting him from removal once he has been elected.
Various methods are possible to accomplish these ends. A requirement
of unanimity on the shareholder level, even if all shares are of one
class of common stock and the minority holder owns less than half, will
help to insure his election even if only the election of directors (rather
than all shareholder action) is required to be unanimous, since the
minority holder can block election of any director unless the other share-
holders agree to his election too. Because he can thus block election
of a successor, such a requirement also helps to protect him from
removal.5
Every lawyer, however, desires to make whatever arrangement he sets
up as "airtight" as possible. The desired board representation can be
made more "airtight" by a shareholder agreement whereby the partic-
ipants agree to vote for the minority member as a director and to keep
him in office as such. A further insurance is to classify the shares of
3. This can be accomplished simply by requiring the affirmative vote of 80% of the
shares, and 4/5 of the directors, respectively.
4. This seems possible under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b), but, for reasons discussed
elsewhere, reliance upon this provision is avoided here. See Kessler, A Close Corporation
Checklist For Drafting the Certificate of Incorporation Under the New York Business
Corporation Law, 31 Fordham L. Rev. 323, 326-29 (1962).
5. Failure to elect replacement directors for two successive annual meetings will,
however, allow any shareholder entitled to vote for directors to petition for judicial dis-
solution, any provision in the certificate of incorporation to the contrary notwithstanding.
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1104(c).
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stock, with each participant being given his own class (i.e., all shares
of it), and each class being given the right to elect its own director,
who will then be removable only by that class.'
The form certificate also contains these provisions for classification
of shares. If used carefully, they will not disqualify the corporation
from the "Subchapter S" tax treatment which most close corporations
will desire.7
Instead of a veto, the participants may want a control proportional
to their financial contributions. In the ordinary corporation, i.e., one
without any special certificate provisions, it will be remembered that
this is impossible, since the majority will have an absolute control over
ordinary management operations and, under the Business Corporation
Law, as opposed to prior law, over many fundamental changes too.'
The share classification provisions coupled with an appropriate number
of directors to mirror the participations (where the number would not
become unwieldy) may be utilized to accomplish such proportional con-
trol. Thus, if one participant is to contribute 10,000 dollars and each
of the other two is to contribute 5,000 dollars to the enterprise, three
classes of stock can be set up with the 10,000 dollars participant's class
entitled to elect two directors, and each of the other classes having the
right to elect one director.0 Manifestly, a general unanimity provision
should then be omitted, however.
Where the number of directors would become unwieldy, a provision
under section 620(b) confiding management to the shareholders can be
used instead."0 If such a provision is used a number of matters covered
in the form certificate, e.g., Article 6, can be omitted.
The general purpose of most of the provisions will be obvious, al-
though, undoubtedly, the seasoned practitioner will be able to make
6. Classification in this sense (as opposed to staggered terms for directors, aso pr-
mitted under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Lax, § 704) is permitted under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 703(a),
if provided for in the certificate of incorporation. Such class directors may only be re-
moved even for cause (i.e., with or without cause) by the class which elects them. N.Y.
Bus. Corp. Law § 706(c)(2).
7. Prentice-Hall, Corporation Letter, July 27, 1964, reports that of 1,2CGO corpora-
tions studied by the Internal Revenue Service, 106,000 had elected Subchapter S, an
increase of 171/% in one year.
S. See Hornstein, Analysis of Business Corporation Law, in McKinney's Business
Corporation Law, app. 1, at 463-65 (1963).
9. Four classes with the $10,000 shareholder being given all of the shares of two is
also a possibility. This is probably the simplest procedure. Each share of each class can
then be absolutely equal in par and all other rights insuring that the corporation will
not be disqualified from Subchapter S tax treatment.
10. See, e.g., the form set out in Kessler, Arbitration of Intra-Corporate Disputes
Under New York Laws, 19 Arb. J. (ns.) 85, 95 (1964). But cf. note 4 supra.
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improvements in verbiage. Explanations for particular provisions and,
in certain instances, alternates are supplied in footnotes to the particular
Articles.
The choice of placing so many provisions in the certificate, rather
than in the by-laws, deserves some justification. In addition to the provi-
sions required for every corporation, certain of the special close cor-
poration provisions (e.g., the high vote and quorum requirements in
Articles 6 and 8, the provision for shareholder election of officers under
Article 7, and the special dissolution provisions contained in Article 9,
as well, of course, as any provisions authorizing any shares and defining
their rights) set out in the form must be included in the certificate or
they will be invalid."
It can be argued that all other provisions should be placed in the
by-laws instead, to avoid encumbering the certificate. Of course, this
could be done. If it is, the attorney should remember to place suitable
provisions in the certificate prohibiting amendment of the by-laws, and
the certificate as well, except by a vote sufficient to protect the interests
of all concerned.' 2
There are, however, certain practical reasons for including the sug-
gested provisions in the certificate rather than merely in the by-laws,
even if the by-laws are made as invulnerable to change in significant
details as the certificate.
In the first place, the certificate is a contract between the shareholders
and the corporation and hence binding on them.' 3 Also, being a public
document it may constitute constructive notice even as to third parties."'
In short, limitations and restrictions contained in the certificate are more
apt to be enforced than those which are merely contained in the by-laws,
a private corporate document.
11. See notes 25-80 to the Certificate infra.
12. This will be necessary to prevent the insertion of contrary controlling provisions
in the certificate which, in the absence of a high vote requirement, only requires a majority
shareholder vote for ordinary amendments. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 803(a); Hornstein,
supra note 8.
13. See In the Matter of American Fibre Chair Seat Corp., 241 App. Div. 532, 535, 272
N.Y. Supp. 206, 210 (2d Dep't 1934). It must be conceded that this also applies to valid
by-laws. Ibid. See also Weber v. Sidney, 19 App. Div. 2d 494, 244 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1st Dep't
1963), aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 929, 200 N.E.2d 867, 252 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1964).
14. See N. A. Berwin & Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co., 199 App. Div. 453, 455, 191 N.Y. Supp.
817, 819 (1st Dep't 1922), stating that one dealing with a corporation "is charged with
the knowledge of the limitations of power therein [in the certificate of incorporation]
expressed in dealing with the officers of the corporation." The rule is contra as to mere
by-law limitations in the absence of actual notice. See, e.g., Barnard, Phillips Factors, Inc.
v. Kaplan Silk Corp., 28 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. City Ct. 1939), aff'd per curiam, 28 N.Y.S.2d
699 (1st Dep't 1941). See generally 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 997 (1940).
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Furthermore, in addition to those expressly required to be set forth
there, certain other provisions, e.g., those voiding transfers in violation
of the certificate, might be construed as "other rights, preferences and
limitations" of the shares and void unless set out in the certificate.'
The focus on careful drafting of the certificate may also prevent in-
advertent omission and the consequent necessity of later amendment.
Secondly, the certificate, being a higher ranking document, will prevail
over possibly conflicting by-law provisions.' Although they should be
as carefully drafted as the certificate, even printed by-laws (with their
typical "Unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation
. . .") may not cause trouble if the certificate embodies all important
management provisions.
Furthermore, when other than form by-laws are used, there is always
the danger that a slightly different but innocent appearing by-law may
turn out to be, in the eyes of the court, "improperly restrictive of the
discretion or powers of the board" and hence invalid because not
included in the certificate.
Of course, provisions apt to change frequently (as, e.g., the value at
which shares will be repurchased), despite a unanimity requirement,
should be left for the by-laws to avoid the bother and expense of a
certificate amendment.1 8
One final point should be mentioned. The draftsman must always be
alert to the tax consequences which will follow from any particular
language utilized. The attempt has been made to set up the provisions
in such a fashion that a "Subchapter S" tax election may be made
15. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 402(a)(5), 501(a).
16. Lasker v. Moreida, 33 Mlisc. 2d 343, 233, N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. 1,63), afi'd mcm, 19
App. Div. 2d S62, 245 N.Y.S.2d 994 (2d Dep't 1963).
17. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b).
1. Other matters, even though vital, should probably also be placed in the by-lawvs
for this reason. For example, the place where shareholder and director mceting will
be held should be definitely fixed, probably alternatively at the corporation's place of
business and the lawyer's office, to prevent the majority from picding a place where it
will be inconvenient or impossible for the minority to attend. Unlezs otherwise provided
in the certificate or by-laws, however, such meetings may be held any place within or
even without the state. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 602(a) (sharholdr's meetings:
"such place, within or without this state, as may be fixed by or under the by-laws"), N.Y.
Bus. Corp. Law § 710 (meetings of the board: "any place within or without this state,
unless otherwise provided by the certificate of incorporation or the by-lav.-s"). Because the
exact addresses may change, it is simpler to leave them to the by-laws. A certificate pro-
vision something like: "All meetings, regular and special, of the shareholders or directors
of this corporation shall be held at the Corporation's office within New York State
designated in Article 3 of this Certificate," can, of course, be used if this inflexibility poses
no obstacle.
1965]
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should that be desired, and to protect the election against an automatic
revocation. (Great care must be used in setting up the classes of shares,
however, if they are to be utilized.) 9 The restriction and redemption
provisions are also designed to avoid estate tax problems, should the
venture prove really successful (or the parties be independently well-
to-do) .20 However, the frequent changes in the tax laws, and new
regulations thereunder, necessitate a periodic reappraisal of the adequacy
of such provisions to secure their purpose.
*CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION'
of
2
UNDER SECTION 402 OF THE
BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW'
In behalf of the corporation hereby formed, 4 the undersigned incor-
porator states:
19. See note 10 to the Certificate infra.
20. The provisions of Article 4, Sections 4 and 6 have been chosen because It was
felt they complied with the requirements of Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958), making
the value set in the implementing by-laws binding for federal estate tax purposes.
1. In the following form, matters which must be covered by every certificate of In-
corporation filed under the Business Corporation Law are marked with an asterisk (*).
As to these requirements see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(a).
Certain other provisions included herein must be set forth in the certificate of In-
corporation if the corporation desires to avail itself of them. The notes to the particular
provisions indicate which are of this nature. See also Henn, Checldist 3: Certificate of
Incorporation, McKinney's Business Corporation Law, app. 4, at 595-99 (1963); Israels,
Corporate Practice 136-37 (1963).
In the preparation of this form a number of forms and form books were consulted.
Where borrowing has been significant as, e.g., from 2 O'Neal, Close Corporations (1958),
appropriate credit has been given. All New York practitioners must, of course, consult
Israels, Corporate Practice (1963) and White, New York Corporations (Kantrowitz &
Slutsky ed. 1963). Other form books of value are, of course, 3 & 4 Am, Jur. Legal
Forms (1953); Casey, Forms of Business Agreements With Tax Ideas (2d ed. 1965);
Fletcher, Corporation Forms Annotated (3d ed. 1957); 3 Nichols, Cyclopedia of Legal
Forms Annotated (1958); Prentice-Hall, Corporation Forms (1965); Rabkin & Johnson,
Current Legal Forms (1964). For the basic requirements of the certificate, Blumberg Form
A-234 may be used.
The expression "squeeze-out" is used frequently in the notes to this certificate, It Is
taken from O'Neal & Derwin, Expulsion or Oppression of Business Associates--"Squeeze-
Outs" in Small Enterprises 3 (1961) [hereinafter cited as O'Neal & Derwin], where the
term is defined as follows: "By the term 'squeeze-out' is meant the use by some of the
owners or participants in a business enterprise of strategic position, inside information,
[Vol. 33
1965] CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION 549
*ARTICLE 1
The name of the corporation is:'
* ARTICLE 2
The purposes for which this corporation is formed are: 6
or powers of control, or the utilization of some legal device or technique, to eliminate
from the enterprise one or more of its owners or participants"
As the authors indicate, the term is synonymous with "freeze-out."
Manifestly, once a control arrangement has been agreed upon, no loopholes should
be left, whereby one participant or faction wil be allowed to upset the arrangement and
take unfair advantage of the other members. The guiding principle in the drafting of
the following form certificate has been, so far as possible, to plug all such loopholes, so
that whatever setup is crystallized will remain indestructible.
2. Name must include "Corporation," "Incorporated," "Limited," "Corp.," "Inc.," or
"Ltd." N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 301(a) (1). As to prohibited names, and names requiring
special approval, see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 301; McKinney's Business Corporation Law
§ 301, Cross References (1963).
3. This language is mandatory. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(a).
4. While corporate existence can probably not begin before filing of the certificate
by the department of state, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, § 403, such language, indicating the
formation of the corporation by the execution of the instrument could conceivably result
in the court's conferring de facto status in such a situation as that in Tisch Auto Supply
Co. v. Nelson, 222 MIich. 196, 192 N.W. 600 (1923), in which the non-filing of the cer-
tificate was excusable. A corporation may still have de facto problems. See Lenny Bruce
Enterprises, Inc. v. Fantasy Records, Inc., 40 Misc. 2d 715, 243 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
5. The name here must, of course, be identical to that above.
6. As to prohibited purposes, see McKinney's Business Corporation Law,' § 201, Cross
References (1963).
No powers are included, since the statutory powers granted by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 202 are broad, and need not be set forth, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(b). As to the in-
advisability of setting them forth, see Simon & Davis, The New York Business Corpora-
tion Law and the Department of State, 36 St. John's L. Rev. 205, 214-15 (1962).
Other special "powers" often included in certificates of incorporation, e.g., allovwing
interested and interlocking directors' contracts, exculpation of directors, and indemnifi-
cation of officers and directors are intentionally omitted, since these are now covered
by statutory provisions, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 713(a), (b), 717, 721-26, which are
exclusive, except that a certificate or by-law provision in effect "at the time of the
accrual of the alleged cause of action asseretd in the threatened or pending action or proceed-
ing in which the expenses were incurred or other amounts were paid" may prohibit or limit
such indemnification. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 726(b)(2). Thus, except to limit indemnifi-
cation, certificate provisions on these subjects are either superfluous as merely rep.ating
the statute, or unacceptable as deviating from it.
The new law is quite generous in providing for indemnification, through an application
to the court, even where the corporation does not wish to give it. Thus, it appears that
unless the corporation desires to take advantage of the proviso, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Lay.
§ 726(b)(2), it may be forced to indemnify a disloyal director or officer for his ex-
penses in a derivative action, or one brought by the corporation itself, where the director
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
* ARTICLE 3
The city, incorporated village7 or town and the county within this
state in which the office of the corporation is to be located are respec-
tively:
or officer wins on a technicality like the statute of limitations. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§§ 722(a), 725(a). In non-derivative actions, civil or criminal, the director or officer
will be entitled not only to his litigation expenses but even the amount of any judgment,
fine, or settlement, "if such director or officer acted, in good faith, for a purpose which he
reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation and, in criminal proceedings,
in addition had no reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful." N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law §§ 723(a); see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 725(a).
The legislative intention is clear. McKinney's Business Corporation Law § 725, Com-
ment (1963), states, in part:
Its design is to authorize indemnification by judicial action to the full extent, subject
to the same standards and qualifications where applicable as in the case of voluntary
corporate indemnification. In addition, resort to a court for indemnification is authorized
when the corporation has failed to provide for indemnification on a voluntary basis, and
even where indemnification has been refused by the directors or shareholders in a specific
case. It must be noted, however, that no indemnification can be awarded by a court
which would be inconsistent with a corporate provision disallowing indemnification, or
otherwise limiting it, in effect at the time of the accrual of the cause of action asserted
in the action or proceeding in which the expenses were incurred or other amounts were
paid . . . [see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 726(b)(2)].
In a close corporation, actions by or in behalf of the corporation against a director or
officer are often merely vehicles for oppression of one of the participants by the others.
To prevent such use Article 7, Section 3 in effect forbids the officers to commence any
such actions, and Article 6 can, if it is so desired, be moulded to prevent any suit against
a participant.
Where a meritorius claim is asserted, however, a director or officer should certainly
not both be allowed to escape liability and also receive reimbursement, where for some
reason or other the director or officer is not finally "adjudged to have breached his duty
to the corporation . . . " N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 722(a).
A provision denying power to the court to indemnify under any circumstances is ap-
parently possible, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 726(b)(2). The following could be used:
In addition to all other limitations otherwise imposed by law, no indemnification shall
be made, paid, allowed or advanced to any person made a defendant in any action civil
or criminal, against any judgment, fine, amounts paid in settlement, or expenses of any
kind, where said person has not been wholly successful on the merits. Nothing herein
contained shall prevent the Corporation itself from awarding any indemnification to any
person, upon complying with the appropriate provisions of the Business Corporation Law,
where such indemnification has also been approved by the directors or shareholders in
accordance with Article 6 or 8 of this Certificate.
Since the right of the court to award indemnification is, as indicated above, more
limited in actions not brought by or in behalf of the corporation, it might be desirable
to deny the right only in the latter type of case. Such a provision as the following might
then be used:
In addition to all other limitations otherwise imposed by law, no indemnification shall
be made, paid or allowed to any person made a party to an action by or in the right
of the Corporation to procure a judgment in its favor by reason of the fact that he, his
testator or intestate, is or was a director or officer of the Corporation, against any ex-
penses incurred by him in connection with the defense of such action or any appeal
therein, unless such director or officer shall have been wholly successful on the merits
and not otherwise.
[Vol. 33
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ARTICLE 4
Section 1. Authorized Shares.-The aggregate number of shares of
stock which this corporation shall have authority to issue shall be
........ shares of Common stock (each with a par value of $ ........
(divided into three classes as follows: ........ shares of "Class A"
Common stock, with a par value of $ ........ per share, and ........
shares of "Class B" Common stock, with a par value of $ ........ per
share, and ........ shares of "Class C" Conmon stock, with a par
value of $ ........ per share.' The shares of all classes shall be identical
in every respect, except that each class, voting as a class, shall have the
right to elect members of the board of directors in the same proportion
which the number of shares in that class bears to the total number of
shares of all classes then outstanding.)'
Again, the final sentence of the preceding form might be added to prevent debarring
the corporation from awarding indemnification where it chooses to, and the requirements
of the statute are met.
Probably the best location for either provision is at the end of the certificate, rather
than as part of this article.
7. The attorney should check to make sure the village is incorporated, and not merely
the name of a section of a larger municipality.
S. This parenthetical statement is to be used if only one class of common stock is to
be issued. It is to be omitted if the common shares are to be divided into different
classes, e.g., to help make a shareholders' agreement to elect certain persons as directors
more "airtight." See introductory text, pp. 544-45 supra. No provision for no par stock is
included, although of course, such stock is permitted, N.Y. Bus. Corp. La, § 402(a)(4),
501(3), since there does not appear to be any advantage to the use of no par over low
par stock.
9. Additional classes of common stock may, of course, be added to accommodate ad-
ditional participants. See, however, note 10 infra.
10. The language in this sentence is used to avoid disqualification of the corporation
for "Subchapter S" tax treatment because of the use of different classes of stocl:. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 1371 forbids this special tax treatment if the corporation has more than
one class of stock outstanding. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1959), implementing this s-c-
tion of the statute, provides: "If the outstanding shares of stock of the corporation are
not identical with respect to the right and interest which they convey in the control,
profits and assets of the corporation, then the corporation is considered to have more
than one class of stock. Thus, a difference as to voting rights, dividend rights, or liquida-
tion preferences of outstanding stock will disqualify a corporation." But the Regulation
continues: "However, if two or more groups of shares are identical in every respect
except that each group has the right to elect members of the board of directors in a
number proportionate to the number of shares in each group, they are conidered one
class of stock." To avoid clever evasions, the section concludes: "If an instrument pur-
porting to be a debt obligation is actually stock, it will constitute a second das of
stock."
Therefore, it is clear that if the financial participation of each Ehareholder is equal,
the corporation may have a number of classes of Common stock equal to the number
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of shareholders, with each class entitled to elect one director, to guarantee each share-
holder board representation, so long as the shares of each class are otherwise identical.
Thus, in a corporation set up by three persons, each desiring to contribute $ 5000 to the
venture, by use of three classes of Common stock, each class having, e.g., 5000 shares of
$ 1 par value (or 500 shares of $ 10 par value, etc.), each shareholder getting all the
shares of his class, and each class entitled to elect one director, each participant can be
guaranteed a place on the board-and under the Business Corporation Law, a place from
which he cannot be removed except by judicial action for cause, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 706(c)(2), (d)-and the corporation can still qualify for "Subchapter S" tax treatment.
Again, if board representation is to be proportional to shareholdings no problem is posed.
Thus, e.g., if one shareholder is to contribute $ 5000 and the other $ 10,000, the "Class A"
Common for the first shareholder can have half as many shares as the "Class B," of tile same
par, all of the latter of which will go to the second more prosperous participant, as long as
,"Class A" elects one director to "Class B" 's two. Because of the form of Article 8,
Section 3, however, it is preferable to have three classes each with an equal number of
shares and each entitled to elect one director, with the shareholder who contributes
the $10,000 being given two classes. For similar reasons, and to insure no "Subchapter
S" disqualification, the following language might also be added at the end of the
section: "In all other respects, the shares of all classes shall vote as though they were
all of one and the same class." See also note 77 infra.
Problems arise where it is desired to give greater board representation than the finan-
cial participation would justify.
By careful planning it would seem possible in certain instances to utilize the classifica-
tion device even where equal board control (i.e., a veto) is desired and the participation
is unequal, without disqualifying the corporation for "Subchapter S" treatment. For
example, in a two man corporation to which one participant will contribute $ 10,000 and
the other $ 7500, the stock can be divided into two classes each having 8750 shares, each
class entitled to elect one director. The shareholder contributing the $ 10,000 can be given
all of the shares of one class and 1250 of the shares of the other, without interfering with
the smaller holder's election of himself to the board. Presumably this division will also
not violate the requirement that shares be entitled to elect a number of directors pro-
portional to the shares in each "group," although the Internal Revenue Service does
not appear to have ruled on the matter, and the device may, accordingly, be dangerous
since the shares might be considered to possess "a difference as to voting rights." If the
chance is to be taken in the use of this device, it should be remembered to delete Section
2(A) of Article 8, substituting therefor a requirement of a simple majority (or whatever
percentage will still give the minority a guarantee of election of his director) for election
and removal of directors (under Article 8, Section 3).
Clearly, preferred stock will disqualify the corporation for "Subchapter S" tax treat-
ment. Furthermore, even for close corporations which do not elect "Subchapter S"
treatment, preferred stock, although it may have utility later on for a wealthy participant
in a successful enterprise, is ordinarily not ideal for the newly formed venture. Ordinary
preferred stock dividends are not deductible by the corporation as business expenses.
They are also taxable to the individual recipients as ordinary income subject, of course,
to a minor $100 exclusion under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 116; the credit is no longer
available, since Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 34, 68A Stat. 13, has been repealed,
78 Stat. 17 (1964), as to dividends received after 1964. There is, therefore, a species
of double taxation. Bonds (or some other form of debt security) are, therefore, preferable,
from a tax point of view, as a means of guaranteeing an investor a fixed return on his
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Section 2. Preemptive Rights."-Each holder of the Common stock
of this corporation (of whatever class) shall have the first right to pur-
chase shares (and securities convertible into shares) of Common stock,
money, since, although fully taxable to the recipient as ordinary income, interest pay-
ments are at least deductible on the corporation's income tax return. Int. Rev. Code of
1954 § 163; Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1 (1957). For this reason no form for authorizing pre-
ferred stock is here set forth.
It should be noted that the certificate may authorize preferred stock without disquali-
fying the corporation for "Subchapter S." It is only the issuance, or more accurately, the
fact that such stock is outstanding which will do so. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1959).
Therefore, a provision authorizing preferred stock "just in case," could be placed in the
certificate, even though the shareholders intend to elect "Subchapter S." Since the e.xact
rights and limitations of such stock can vary considerably, it would seem ver, how-
ever, to wait until (if ever) the need arises, and then insert the provisions by amend-
ment, under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ S01(b)(7), (12), (13), 105.
If, however, preferred stock is to be issued immediately, provisions should be !et forth
here authorizing issuance of such stock, and setting forth the relative rights, preferences
and limitations on such shares. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(a)(5). If these shares are
to be issued in series, see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 402(a)(6), 502. As to posible provi-
sions, see Israels, Corporate Practice 389-96 (1963); 2 0'Ncal, Close Corporations §§ 10.04,
.05 (1953); as to possible restrictions on dividends to junior shares where cumulative
preferred shares are issued, see Baker & Cary, Cases on Corporations 1011-12 (3d ed.
unabr. 1958).
If preferred stock is to be issued, Article 10 should he deleted, since "Subchapter S"
tax treatment will not be available, and appropriate modifications w.ill have to be made
in Section 4 of Article 4, Section 7 of Article 6, Section 4 of Article 7 and in Article 9.
A requirement of an offer of all the shareholder's stock, common and preferred, should
be considered, but the offerees should probably be the common stockholders (pro rata) after
the corporation.
Certainly, under Article 4, Section 6, the corporation should be required to repurchase
all of the shareholder's stock, to enable the holder to take advantage of Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 302(b)(3).
No certificate authorization for bonds is required unless they are to be given voting rights,
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 202(a)(7), 51S(c), a dangerous procedure from a tax point of
view, since such voting bonds may he treated as a class of stock. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g)
(1959); Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1(c) (1957).
It is, as indicated elsewhere, dangerous to authorize more shares than it is prsently
contemplated will be initially issued. Kessler, A Close Corporation Checklist for Drafting
the Certificate of Incorporation under the New York Business Corporation Law, 31
Fordham L. Rev. 323, 331 (1962) ; see O'Neal & Derwin § 4.14. See also note 11 infra.
If cumulative voting is to be allowed the following provision should be inserted as a
separate section after this section:
In all elections of directors of this Corporation, each shareholder shall be entitled to as
many votes as shall equal the number of votes which, except for these provisions as to
cumulative voting, he would be entitled to cast for the election of directors with respect
to his shares multiplied by the numher of directors to be elected, and he may cast all
of such votes for a single director or may distribute them among the number to he voted
for, or any two or more of them, as he may see fit.
11. Preemptive rights are one means of preventing a "squeeze-out" of a minority share-
holder through issuance of additional stock in the corporation. It is obvious that in a two
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man corporation, in which each holder has an equal number of shares, e.g., 5000 shares of
$ 1 par, if either holder acquires only one more share he can gain full control of the corpora-
tion if no veto provisions protecting the minority appear in the certificate. As indicated
below, ordinarily a universal veto will be undesirable, and, therefore, any changes in the
number of shares held by a participant may affect, if not upset, the control arrangement of
the corporation.
Furthermore, the issuance of any new shares will upset the financial balance In the
corporation if it has a surplus in which the new shares are entitled to participate, and these
shares are issued merely at par. Thus, in the example, if the corporation has a surplus
of $30,000, and 5000 new shares are issued to one holder (or an outsider) the (book)
value of the 5000-share-holder's shares automatically goes down from $ 20,000 to $15,000.
It is important, therefore, to the close corporate setup to prevent the corporate "pie" from
being cut up into more pieces through share issuance, whether the new shares are considered
in their control or financial aspect, unless the minority's interests are suitably protected.
In order to make such protection "airtight" the following means should all be used:
(1) limit the number of shares which may be issued to those really necessary for financing
the corporation (see note 10 supra); (2) prevent issuance of any shares, even though
authorized, which will result in unfair treatment of the minority, either through dilution
of control or financial interest (guaranteed by a veto on the director level in Article 6,
Section 9(C)); (3) prevent any increase in the number of shares which may be issued
(guaranteed by a veto over amendment of the certificate in Article 8, Section 2 (J)) ; (4) pre-
vent any indirect issuance of additional shares, through options, etc., otherwise possible
by the board or a majority of shareholders under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 505 (forbidden
by Article 4, Section 3, unless unanimously approved under Article 8, Section 2(K));
(5) guarantee that if any new shares are nonetheless issued the minority will have a
chance to preserve their proportionate interest through purchase of sufficient shares to do so,
i.e., granting a preemptive right to purchase any new shares issued. Needless to say, how-
ever, a preemptive right is of no value if a shareholder does not have sufficient funds to
purchase the necessary shares. See Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 342 Ill. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d
122 (1951).
Preemptive rights are, therefore, one, but not alone a sufficient, weapon in the arsenal
necessary to protect (or "freeze") the original power-financial structure.
This section of the certificate is based on a form in 2 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 10.04,
at 248 (1958), modified to meet the requirements of New York law. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 622 governs preemptive rights. It generally accords such rights to ordinary common
shareholders, unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise. However, N.Y.
Bus. Corp. Law § 622(e) denies such rights in certain situations. It provides:
(e) Unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation, shares or other securities
offered for sale or subjected to rights or options to purchase shall not be subject to pre-
emptive rights if they:
(1) Are to be issued by the board to effect a merger or consolidation or offered or
subjected to rights or options for consideration other than cash;(2) Are to he issued or subjected to rights or options under paragraph (d) of section 505
(Rights and options to purchase shares; issue of rights and options to directors, officers and
employees) ;
(3) Are to be issued to satisfy conversion or option rights theretofore granted by the
corporation;
(4) Are treasury shares;
(5) Are part of the shares or other securities of the corporation authorized in its original
certificate of incorporation and are issued, sold or optioned within two years from the
date of filing such certificate; or
(6) Are to be issued under a plan of reorganization approved in a proceeding under any
applicable act of congress relating to reorganization of corporations.
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(of whatever class,) of this corporation that may hereafter be issued
at any time later than one month after the filing of this Certificate,
whether or not presently authorized, and including Treasury shares and
shares issued for a consideration other than cash, in the ratio that the
total number of shares of (all classes of) Common stock he holds at
the time of the issue bears to the total number of shares of Common
stock (of all classes) outstanding. This right shall be deemed waived
by any holder of Common stock who does not exercise it by paying
for the stock preempted within ........ days of receipt of a notice in
writing from the Corporation inviting him to exercise the right."a
Section 3. Convertible Securities and Stock Options."1-This cor-
poration shall not create or issue any securities convertible into stock,
nor any rights or options to purchase any shares of its stock or securities
convertible into stock, without the approval of its shareholders in accord-
ance with the provisions of Article S.
Section 4. Restricted Transfer.la4No shareholder shall during his
Shares issued in a bankruptcy reorganization pose no problem. Shares issued in con-
junction with a merger or consolidation cannot pose a problem if mergers and consolila-
tions require unanimous shareholder and director consent (see Article 3, Section 2(D),
Article 6, Section 9(H)). Shares issued under options, and securities convertible into shares
should pose no problem if, as suggested (Article 3, Section 2(K); Article 6, Section 9(D));
they require unanimous shareholder and director approval. The remaining 'loopholes"
(through issue of stock for other than cash, treasury shares, and shares which are part
of those originally authorized), are "plugged" by the language suggested in the section.
12. References to different classes can be omitted if only one class of stock is utilized.
Where different classes are used the parentheses should be omitted but the words enclosed
therein retained. The parenthetical expression "and securities convertible into share' should
in either case be retained, and in parentheses.
13. Although N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 622(g) is somewhat ambiguous on the point, it
would appear that any number of days in excess of 14 may be inserted. Clearly, the longer
the time given to the shareholder to obtain the money to make the purchase, the more
effective will be his preemptive right.
14. This section is designed to prevent dilution of a minority shareholder's interest
by such indirect means as convertible bonds, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 519(b), and stock
options N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 505. See note 11 supra.
15. Sections 4 and 6 of this Article are taken, slightly modified, from Gould, Davis &
Hoxie, Stock Purchase Agreements and the Close Corporation 56-57 (National Life Insur-
ance Company, 1960).
Restrictions on inter vos transfer of shares are necessary to keep a corporation close.
Otherwise a key participant could sell (or give) his shares to a person who cannot or
will not "pull his oar" by working for the success of the enterprise, or, more likely and
worse, he can extort unwarranted concessions from his co-participants by a threat to
make such a disposition. Such transfers can-and, accordingly, the threat of their ue can
be an effective club-also be used to terminate a "Subchapter S" tax election, e.g., by the
simple expedient of transferring a portion of his shares to enough persons so that the total
number of shareholders exceeds ten, Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 1371(a)(1), 1372(e)(3).
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Such restrictions can take various forms. See Henn, Corporations 419, 430-31 (1961);
2 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 7.05 (1958). Although an absolute prohibition on transfer
would be invalid, reasonable restrictions are valid, Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d
534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957). Giving the corporation (or other share-
holders) a first option is, therefore, permissible. Perhaps even requiring the consent of tile
other participants to any inter vivos transfer would also be valid. See Penthouse Properties,
Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Ave., Inc., 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1st Dep't 1939);
Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 12 Misc. 2d 774, 177 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd,
7 App. Div. 2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1st Dep't 1958), rev'd, 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720,
190 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959). However, because the court of appeals has not yet approved,
in other than cooperative-apartment cases, it is not completely safe to rely on such a
restriction. See 1910 Ops. Att'y Gen. 404. See generally, as to "consent" restrictions, 18 Am.
Jur. 2d Corporations § 385 (1965). Such a provision also places too much power in tile
hands of the other participants: because they can veto any transfer, they can blackmail any
participant to sell at whatever price they choose.
Accordingly, a first option guaranteeing any departing participant a fair return seems
the best arrangement-the golden mean which should be acceptable to all participants.
If he gets his fair return it makes no difference to him whether the corporation or the
other shareholders repurchase his shares. The alternate "cross-option" (repurchase by the
shareholders rather than the corporation) is equally acceptable to the remaining share-
holders since their proportionate interests remain unchanged. It can be utilized to keep the
corporation close even though the corporation lacks a sufficient surplus necessary to make the
repurchase itself. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 513(a).
Under the cross-option provision, the only danger of upsetting the proportionality arises
if not all shareholers are able to purchase their proper portions. Here, however, It seems
better to allow an upset in the balance than to have the shares fall into the hands of
outsiders.
The final alternative for an inter vivos offer again prevents the departing shareholder
from taking advantage of his co-participants where the value fixed in the by-laws for some
reason no longer accurately reflects the market value of the shares. It is a variation on
the "best-outside-offer" valuation method.
Although the offer price could be fixed in the certificate it seems better to leave this for
by-law determination for two inter-related reasons: (1) the somewhat greater flexibility
of the by-laws, since, although they can only be amended by unanimous consent (Article 8,
Section 2(1)) to guarantee fairness of the price set to all concerned, amendment can be
accomplished without the trouble and expense of a certificate amendment; (2) the necessity
for such frequent readjustment in the purchase price to prevent imposition by either the
departing or remaining shareholders upon the other.
A fixed price is least likely to give rise to litigation because of differing interpretation,
and hence is the most satisfactory valuation method. If the price were set in the certificate,
it could, of course, be par or issue price or any other arbitrary figure. The dangers of
unfairness of any of these are obvious, since if the business is successful the retiring share-
holder is bound to be disadvantaged if the price set is a low one, as it is most apt to be
in a new corporation if it is to be at all realistic. On the other hand, setting a deliberately
high price would in effect mean utilizing only the "best-outside-offer" option. Since, as will
be indicated below, it is best to have a binding agreement to repurchase on death, and,
accordingly, some fair method of valuation other than "best-outside-offer" will be advisable
there, it is simpler and fairer to have one acceptable method for both inter vivos and
death dispositions. A fixed but yearly redetermined value is the one which seems most
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lifetime sell, assign, mortgage, hypothecate, transfer, pledge, create a
security interest in or lien on, encumber, give, place in trust I voting
or other),' or otherwise dispose of all or any portion of his stock
interest in the Corporation except that if a shareholder should desire to
so dispose of any of his stock in the Corporation during his lifetime,
he shall first offer to sell all of his stock to the Corporation at a price
determined in accordance with the provisions of the by-laws of this
Corporation. Any shares not purchased by the Corporation within
........ days after receipt of such offer in writing shall be offered at
the same price to the other shareholders, each of whom shall have the
right to purchase such portion of the remaining stock offered for sale
as the number of shares owned by him at such date shall bear to the
total number of shares owned by all the other shareholders excluding the
selling shareholder, provided, however, that if any shareholder does not
purchase his full proportionate share of the stock, the balance of the
stock may be purchased by the other shareholders equally. If the stock
is not purchased by the remaining shareholders within ........ days
of the receipt of the offer to them, the shareholder desiring to sell his
stock may sell it to any other person but shall not sell it without giving
the Corporation and the remaining shareholders the right to purchase
such remaining stock at the price and on the terms offered to such other
person.1
7
practical and also fairest. Because, then, it will change, the by-laws seem the appropriate
place for insertion of the value, and whatever alternative formula is to be used should
the shareholders fail to agree on a new valuation within a reasonable time. See Helms v.
Duckworth, 249 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1957), in which the younger shareholder refused to
revalue, hoping to acquire the older participant's shares at a bargain price when the latter
died.
16. See Gamson v. Robinson, 2S4 App. Div. 945, 135 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Ist Dep't 1954)
(memorandum decision); Henn, Corporations 434 (1961); 2 O'Neal, Clowe Corporations
§ 2S (1953).
17. "Non-waiver" provisions could be added. They might take the following form:
but in the event of any such transfer to such other person all of the conditions of this
Article shall immediately attach to and bind said shares in the hands of the transferee,
and the failure to exercise any of the options herein contained shall not relieve said shares
or any part thereof permanently from the conditions of this Article, and all of said condi-
tions shall again attach to the shares and bind each successive holder thereof as soon as he
acquires them, provided that no person who may hereafter become such a transferee or
subsequent transferee shall be entitled to any of the benefits of any of the options con-
tained in this section, except by consent of the shareholders in accordance with Article 8
of this Certificate.
To avoid any question under "Subchapter S" of a difference in rights, the transferee
might expressly be accorded, instead, the same rights as the original holder to purchase
his proportionate part of any shares not repurehased by the corporation from another
retiring shareholder. However, the alternates of first option to the corporation, and then
cross-option to the shareholders make so unlikely any transfer to an outsider of the shares
1965]
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Section 5. Involuntary Transfers.'8-Any person who becomes the
holder or possessor of any shares, or share certificates, of this Corpora-
tion by virtue of any judicial process, attachment, bankruptcy, receiver-
ship, execution or judicial sale, shall immediately offer all of said shares
to the Corporation, whenever requested by the Board of Directors so
to do, at the price fixed by the by-laws of this Corporation, and none of
originally issued that such a provision would seem unnecessary. If it were desired to admit
a new participant, he could then be made to expressly agree to be bound by any restric-
tions. If the shares constituted a new issue, e.g., to replace shares redeemed under the
corporation's first option, they would seem to be bound directly by virtue of the provi-
sions already set forth in the certificate. See Tomoser v. Kamphausen, 307 N.Y. 797, 121
N.E.2d 622 (1954) (per curiam); Mohawk Natl Bank v. Schenectady Bank, 78 Hun 90,
28 N.Y.S. 1100 (Sup. Ct. 1894), aff'd mem., 151 N.Y. 665, 46 N.E. 1149 (1897). See generally
Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1958).
18. The likelihood of a creditor of a shareholder getting possession of any shares, or
share certificates, has been diminished by the provisions of Article 4, Section 4 which
forbid use of the shares as collateral. However, it is always conceivable that tile shares
might be seized to satisfy some independent debt of the shareholder. To keep the corpora-
tion close even in such circumstances, the above provision has been added, modified from
Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 At. 723 (Sup. Ct. 1930). Although
possibly not enforceable, such a provision may help. There appear to be no New York cases
directly in point. See, however, Farmers' & Traders' Bank v. Haney, 87 Iowa 101, 54 N.W.
61 (1893), holding that a corporate lien was superior to that of a levying creditor with
knowledge of it. See also, Mohawk Nat'l Bank v. Schenectady Bank, 78 Hun 90, 28 N.Y.S.
1100 (Sup. Ct. 1894), aff'd mem., 151 N.Y. 665, 46 N.E. 1149 (1897). In Estate Funds, Inc.
v. Burton-Fifth Ave. Corp., 111 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sup. Ct. 1952), the court held that a
pledgee could not foreclose on pledged stock subject to a restriction, without first offering
the stock to the other shareholders. But see, Matter of Trilling and Montague, 140 F. Supp.
260 (ED. Pa. 1956), holding that the trustee in bankruptcy was not bound by a share
repurchase agreement, which apparently, however, was not made expressly applicable to
involuntary transfers. See also Matter of Starbuck, 251 N.Y. 439, 167 N.E. 580 (1929),
which, although holding that a corporation had to transfer shares of a deceased holder
to his executrix on its books (despite a statutory provision, N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 66,
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1923, ch. 787, § 66, that the directors might refuse to transfer stock of a
shareholder indebted to the corporation), added that it need not recognize a transfer by
the executrix. See generally 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 391 (1965); Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d
745, 754 (1948).
Although the provision could be drafted to require the attaching creditor, etc., to
follow the same procedure (first offer to corporation, "cross-option," then "best-outside-
offer") as a shareholder voluntarily selling, a provision only requiring an offer to the corpora-
tion at the price fixed for repurchase from an ordinary shareholder, which should represent
the fair value of the stock, has been deliberately chosen since the fairer and less burdensome
the provision is to the outsider the more apt the court is to enforce it. A court desiring
to do so can, e.g. point to the fact that a similar provision has been utilized as long
ago as 1930, the date of Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., supra.
Should the emergency which this section is designed to meet eventuate, the corporation
should, and should be able to, produce the surplus necessary to repurchase the shares,
if the corporation is worth saving. See also note 19 infra.
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such shares shall be entitled to any vote, nor shall any dividend be paid
or allowed upon any of such shares, after failure to comply with such
request.
Section 6. Redemption on Death.'9 --Upon the death of any share-
holder, the Corporation shall purchase, and the estate of the decedent
shall sell, all of the decedent's shares in the Corporation, and the Corpo-
ration shall take such action as may be necessary to permit it to make
such purchase. Title to all of said shares shall be deemed to vest in the
Corporation immediately upon the death of any such shareholder. The
purchase price of such stock shall be computed in accordance with the
provisions of the by-laws of this Corporation.
Section 7. Dissenting Shareholders.Y--In the event that any share-
19. It is, of course, essential to make any restrictions on share transfers exprez:ly binding
on the estate of a deceased holder in order to keep the corporation dose. See Globe Slicing
Mlach. Co. v. Hasner, 223 F. Supp. SS9 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). In such a corporation there
is usually no ready market for the shares of a participant. If the estate of a deceased is
bound by a first option to sell to the corporation and the other shareholders but the latter
are given the option to refuse to buy, as in many agreements, e.g., that in Law-,on v. House-
hold Fin. Corp., supra note 18, it is, then, ordinarily to the advantage of the other
shareholders (for themselves and their corporation) to reject the offer, and blackmail
the estate into selling at a lower price than the real value of the stock. Accordingly, to
insure fairness, this provision requires the corporation to repurchase the shares of a deceased
shareholder at the inter vivos value fixed in the by-laws. Since upon incorporation no
participant will know which will die first, all should be willing to agree to insert the section,
which prevents the survivors from later taking advantage of the widow and children of the
participant unfortunate enough to die first.
Such a provision should be enforceable as an "agreement" under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 514, as long as the corporation has a surplus when it is called upon to repurchase. Life
insurance, owned by the corporation and payable to it as beneficiary, should be used to
help guarantee the availability of such a surplus. (The cash proceeds of the policy will
increase the assets, and result in a corresponding increase in the "Shareholder's Equity"
on the right hand side of the balance sheet.) Should the surplus still not be sufficient, the
corporation is required (under the clause requiring it to take such action as may be
necessary) to reduce the stated capital to the extent necessary to create the sufficient surplus.
See Prentice-Hall, Corporation Forms, f 106, at 143 (1965). It is to be ob:rrved that
even such an artificially created surplus is sufficient, since the Business Corporation Lavw
only requires a "surplus" not an "earned surplus" for share repurchases. N.Y. Bus. Corp.
Law §§ 513(a), 102(a)(13). Compare N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 102(a)(6), with N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 102(a) (2).
It should be noted that the provisions of this section and Section 4, where the by-lav,-s
fix a fair arm's length price, should meet the requirements of Treas. Re,. § 20031-2th)
(195S), so that if the deceased shareholder is in the federal estate tax bracket the valuation
should control for such tax purposes. See Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. n 1202.03.
20. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that no shareholder can use a diZent and
appraisal as a way of escape from the share restrictions, or a blackanail device against his
fellow shareholders, by threatening to veto corporate action requiring shareholder approval
unless he is bought out at a higher price than the agreed value of his shares. See Sands
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holder becomes entitled to payment of the fair value of his shares under
§ 623 of the Business Corporation Law, or any amendment thereto, or
related or similar statute, the fair value of his shares for all purposes
thereunder shall be conclusively presumed to be the aforesaid price fixed
by the by-laws of this Corporation, and the shareholder shall be bound
to accept any offer of the Corporation to pay said amount in exchange
for his shares.
Section 8. Transfers Void. 1"-No purported sale, assignment, mortgage,
hypothecation, transfer, pledge, creation of a security interest in or lien
on, encumbrance of, gift of, trust (voting or other) of, or other disposition
of any of the shares of this Corporation by any shareholder in violation
of the provisions of this Certificate of Incorporation or the by-laws shall
be valid, and the Corporation shall not transfer any of said shares on the
books of the Corporation, nor shall any of said shares be entitled to vote,
nor shall any dividends be paid thereon during the period of any such
violation. Such disqualifications shall be in addition to and not in lieu
of any other remedies legal or equitable to enforce said provisions.
Section 9. Applicability of Other Portions of this Certificate.2 -
Point Co. v. Rossmoore, 43 Misc. 2d 368, 251 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. 1964), holding
that a repurchase provision, not specifically dealing with the subject, did not prevent a share-
holder from dissenting and receiving the appraised value of his shares rather than tile
price fixed for an ordinary redemption. There would seem to be no statutory objection to
an advance agreed value for the shares, since N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 623(g) provides for an
agreement between the dissenting shareholder and the corporation (by acceptance of the
corporation's offered price) as to value. Furthermore, there should be no objection to
an agreed "fair value" fixed in advance for purposes of N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 623(h)(4)
which provides for the court to fix the "fair value" of the shares, where the corporation's
offer is not accepted.
21. The detailing of varied corporate remedies is, of course, designed to make the restric-
tion provisions as airtight as possible. There is no point in enumerating the sometimes con-
flicting New York decisions on the remedies available. The object of the provision is to
guarantee that if one device fails another will be successful in preventing any transfers
of whatever nature which violate the basic agreement. See 2 O'Neal, Close Corporations
§ 7.17 (1958).
Although provisions prescribing the mode of payment could be added, see, e.g., Lawson v.
Household Fin. Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 At. 723 (Sup. Ct. 1930), it is simpler to
leave these matters for the by-laws.
See generally as to restrictions on transfer of shares, Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1958);
Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1159 (1930).
22. The purpose of this provision is to guarantee that any additional limitations imposed
by the by-laws will also be upheld. It should be observed in this connection that unlike many
jurisdictions, New York upholds reasonable share restrictions even though only contained
in the by-laws and not the certificate, at least as to persons with notice. See Allen v.
Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957), and the
provision for adequate notice in Article 11. It is also designed to pave the way for such
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Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to limit or render
ineffective any other provisions of this Certificate of Incorporation or
the by-laws further restricting or conditioning the transfer of shares
of this Corporation, or providing penalties or disqualifications for viola-
tions of said restrictions or conditions."3
% ARTICLE 5
The Secretary of State of New York is hereby designated as agent
of the Corporation upon whom process against it may be served. The
post office address to which the Secretary of State shall mail a copy of
any process against the corporation served upon him is:2
ARTICLE 6
Section 1. Nlumber of Directors.'--The number of directors which
provisions as those in Article 10 designed to guarantee that a Subchapter S election will
not be terminated by share transfers.
23. See also note 26 infra.
24. The post office address may be within or without the state. A post office box rather
than street address is sufficient. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 104(b).
The Secretary of State must be designated as a process agent. NY. Bus. Corp. Law § 3G4.
A registered agent may be appointed as an additional agent for service of process. If one
is desired the following provision should be added as Section 2 of this Article:
*............ ....................... (Name of individual resident of and with
business address in state, or domestic or foreign corporation licensed to do busines in state;
see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 305(a)), whose address within this state is: ..................
............................... (Must include street and number or other particular
description) is hereby designated as registered agent of this corporation, and is to be the
agent of the Corporation, in addition to the Secretary of State, upon whom proce:s against
it may be served.
The lawyer for the corporation may, of course, be designated as registered agent, or one
of the service companies may be used. Although the designation of a rcgistered agent
may make service of process easier for a potential plaintiff against the corporation, it should
also be noted that the corporation will be promptly notified of any suit against it if a
reliable agent is designated, and the plaintiff chooses to avail himself of this mode of service.
25. The number of directors may be fixed in the certificate, if desired, where there are
to be three or more. Where there are to be only two shareholders only two directors are
necessarv, although more may be used, e.g., to give additional board power to the share-
holder contributing a greater investment. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 702(a). Similarly, a one
man corporation need only have one director. However, should the number of shareholders
of a one or two man corporation increase, the number of directors would also have to
increase, if set at less than the number of shareholders, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 702 a),
Manifestly, if the number of directors can be increased by a majority of the shareholders,
as it can if the certificate is silent (the number is fixed in the by-laws under N.Y. Bus,
Corp. Law § 702(a), and the by-lawts can be amended by a majority of the voting
shareholders at a shareholder's meeting at which a quorum is present, under N.Y. Bus. Corp,
Law §§ 601(a), 60(a)-a by-law may even be passed by a similar shareholder vote to allow
the directors themselves to increase their number), this poses a danger to the minority. If the
number of directors is fixed in the by-laws and these can only be amended by unanimous
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
this corporation shall have shall be fixed in the by-laws (but shall in
no case exceed the number of shareholders). There shall be no increase
or decrease in the number of directors except as approved by the share-
holders as hereinafter provided in Article 8.
Section 2. Requirement that Directors be Shareholders.2 -No director
of this Corporation shall qualify as such unless he is a shareholder.
Whenever any director of this Corporation shall cease to be a share-
holder his office as director shall become vacant.
Section 3. Vacancies.2 ---All vacancies on the board of directors how-
shareholder action as provided in Article 8, Section 2(I) the danger is removed. If the
participation of each shareholder is to be equal and his representation on the board to
correspond to that participation, the parenthetical clause may be added to make the
arrangement airtight, and also to handle the situation when the number of shareholders
is less than three, without the necessity for amendment of the by-laws to accommodate any
decreases or increases in their number.
26. This form and those set forth below in this note are based on a form contained In
2 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 10.24 (1958). It is designed as a further safeguard against
packing the board by the majority in violation of the original control arrangement. Alterna-
tive provisions requiring a certain percentage of stock ownership can be utilized where it
is possible that some shares will be given to the families of the participants or employees,
but it is desired to prevent them from having a say in the ordinary management of the
corporation. Unless modified such a gift will require a waiver of the Article 4 provisions by
all the shareholders under Article 8. The following is a possible form:
No director of this Corporation shall qualify as such unless he is the holder of at least
...... percent of the outstanding Common stock of this Corporation. Whenever any director
of this Corporation shall cease to hold that percentage of the Corporation's outstanding
Common stock, his office as director shall become vacant.
Where classes of shares are used, the form could read:
No director of this Corporation shall qualify as such unless he is the holder of at least
...... percent of the Class A, or at least ...... percent of the Class B, or at least ......
percent of the Class C Common stock of this Corporation then outstanding. Whenever any
director of this Corporation shall cease to hold the requisite percentage of shares as aforesaid
his office as director shall become vacant.
Such percentage provisions are also an additional safeguard, if the appropriate percentage
is chosen, should any shares be transferred to outsiders despite Article 4, to prevent the
upset of the prearranged control arrangement.
27. This provision guards against the dangers posed by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 705(a).
See Gearing v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 201, 182 N.E.2d 391, 227 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1962). In lieu
of this provision and that in Section 4 of this Article, the following from 2 O'Neal, Close
Corporations § 10.09 (1958) may be used where the shares are classified and unanimity
is not necessary:
Section 3. Election of Directors. Class A Directors shall be elected by the affirmative
vote of holders of at least a majority of the shares of Class A Common Stock at the time
outstanding. The holders of Class B Common Stock may not vote in the election of
Class A Directors. The Directors of Class B Common Stock shall be elected by the affirma-
tive vote of holders of at least a majority of the shares of Class B Common Stock at that
time outstanding. The holders of Class A Common Stock may not vote in the election of
Class B Directors.
Section 4. Removal of Directors and Filling Vacancies. Holders of Class A Common
Stock shall have the right by the affirmative vote of holders of at least a majority of the
shares of that class of stock at the time outstanding to remove any or all of the Class A
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ever created shall be filled only by the shareholders, and only as herein-
after provided in Article 8.
Section 4. E2ection and Removal.28 -No director shall be elected or
removed for any reason whatsoever except by the shareholders, and
only as hereinafter provided in Article S.
Section 5. Comnpensation.2 -- The board of directors shall have no
power to fix the compensation of any director for serving in any capacity.
Such compensation shall be fixed only by the shareholders, and only as
hereinafter provided in Article S.
Section 6. No Power to Mortgage or Pledge.2--The board of directors
shall have no power to sell, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other-
wise dispose of, nor to encumber or create any security interest in or
lien on, any of the property, real or personal, of the corporation without
the respective approval of the directors or shareholders as hereinafter
provided in this Article and Article 8.
Section 7. Engaging in Other BusinessY-No director of this Cor-
Directors, with or without cause, and shall have the right by that vote to fill any vacancy
among the Class A Directors, whether arising from removal of a director or from other
cause. Holders of Class B Common Stock shall have the right by the affirmative vote
of holders of at least a majority of the shares of that class of stock at the time outstanding
to remove any or all of the Class B Directors, with or without cause, and shall have power
by that vote to fill any vacancy among the Class B Directors, whether arising from removal
of a director or from other cause. (Italics omitted.)
If these provisions are used, Clause A of Article 3, Section 2 should be omitted, and the
following clauses relettered.
2S. This provision will prevent upsetting the control arrangement by removal of a
director by the shareholders "for cause," except with his con-ent, see Article 3, Section
2(A), and also will prevent adoption of a by-law' allowing removal "for cause" by the
directors, or without cause by the shareholders. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 705(a), (b).
See also note 27 supra.
29. This provision prevents unfair treatment of shareholders w.ho may not be on the
board, e.g., the estate of a deceased shareholder should the representative and the corporation
waive their rights under Article 4, Section 6, through diversion of corporate profits into
'alaries" for board members. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713(c).
30. If unanimity is required under Article 3, Section 2(E) and Article 6, Section 9(G),
the power to mortgage, pledge, etc., will not prove a danger. Othervise, the board
has power to mortgage all corporate assets without shareholder consent, N.Y. Bus. Corp,
Law § 911, a manifest danger to minority directors and " fortiori to participants not repre-
sented on the board.
31. This provision was suggested by Miss. Bus. Corp. Act § 5369-71, and is designed
to prevent a decision such as that in Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 369 IMass. 417, 34 NXE2d
704 (1941), which gave insufficient protection to their corporation from comp.tition by
its own directors and officers.
The words 'nor engage in any other business' might be added after the word "partner-
ship" if not too restrictive of the activities of the participants. Such limitations on outside
business should be permissible under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 701, as to director., and
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 715(g), as to officers.
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poration shall become a director, officer, or employee of any other cor-
poration, or association, nor a partner in any partnership, without the prior
express approval of the shareholders as hereinafter provided in Article 8.
The office of any director violating this provision shall immediately be-
come vacant, and all shares of stock in this Corporation held by him shall
immediately be offered for repurchase by the Corporation at the lesser
of the amount fixed in the by-laws pursuant to Section 4 of Article 4 of
this Certificate or (par) ($.... ).
Section 8. Quorum of Directors.3S-The presence of all directors of
this Corporation shall be necessary to constitute a quorum for the
transaction of any business, except as otherwise provided in Section 11
of this Article.
Section 9. High Vote of Directors.33 -The affirmative vote of all of
the directors shall be required for the transaction of the following items
of business:
(A) The hiring, discharge or indemnification of any employees (other
than as officers or directors) of the Corporation, and the fixing of the
compensation (of whatever form, direct or indirect, and whether paid
to said employee or to a third party) and duties of all such employees,
whether by contract or otherwise.3 4
(B) The discharge or suspension of any officer, except as otherwise
required by Section 4 of Article 7.35
32. Permitted by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 709(a) (1) and required to be in the certificate
for effectiveness. Of course, a number less than all can be substituted, if desired. One object
of such a high quorum provision is to allow a director to prevent being outvoted through
the simple expedient of staying away from a meeting at which a unanimous vote is not
required. As a result of the decision in Gearing v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 201, 182 N.E.2d 391, 227
N.Y.S.2d 897 (1962), this device may no longer prove successful, since the case held a
director who stayed away from the meeting could not question its validity.
33. Authorized by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 709(a)(2), if in the certificate. Of course,
less than all of the directors can be required. Unless the certificate fixes the number of directors
(see Article 6, Section (1)), however, the number required for board action should be fixed
as a fraction or percentage, here.
34. Unless deprived of the power by virtue of a N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b) pro.
vision, the board has the power under its general management function to hire and fire
corporate employees. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 701; Staklinski v. Pyramid Elec. Co.,
6 App. Div. 2d 565, 180 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st Dep't 1958), aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78,
188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959). Indemnification of employees (not officers and directors) is
not regulated by statute. McKinney's Business Corporation Law § 721 & Comment. Em-
ployment contracts may be a way of guaranteeing financial security to the participants
whether or not they are removed from their jobs as officers. Such agreements may also
be used as a device to filter off corporate profits to the majority or their relations. See
O'Neal & Derwin § 3.06. Whence the need for unanimous approval, to protect minority
interests. See also note 63 infra.
35. Although discharge of an officer should be within the exclusive province of the
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(C) The issuance of, and consideration for, any shares of stock of
the Corporation, including Treasury shares. 0
(D) The issuance of any rights or options to purchase, and the
issuance of any securities convertible into, shares of stock of the Cor-
poration, whether under a plan or otherwise, and to whomsoever issued.-'
(E) Any change in the stated capital of the Corporation which by
law the board of directors is authorized to make. 5
(F) The declaration of any dividend, including any deficiency divi-
dend, or the making of any distribution to the shareholders of this
Corporation, whether in cash, property, stock, bonds or other securities
of this or any other Corporation. 0
(G) Any sale, gift, assignment, or other transfer of, lease, exchange,
shareholders by virtue of Article 7, Section 1, and Article S, Section 2(B), a repetition
of the provision here will prevent removal of any officer appointed by the board under
a waiver of these provisions, and the requirement of unanimity for suspension plugs the
loophole of N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 716(a) which allows an officer even though appointed by
the shareholders to be suspended by the board.
36. Plugs a loophole under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 504(c), created by the power of
the board to issue up to the authorized limit (set in Article 4, Section 1) of par stock at par,
although this may dilute the interest of shareholders not purchasing. See Ros3 Transport,
Inc. v. Crothers, 185 AMd. 573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946) ; Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair
Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 917 (1930); O'Neal & Derwin § 4.14. Despite the change in
verbiage in the course of passage ("on such terms and conditions as are" was Eubstituted
for "for such consideration as is"), N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 504(e), which provides: "Trea-
sury shares may be disposed of by a corporation on such terms and conditions as are fihed
from time to time by the board," apparently authorizes rcissue of treasury stock at evcn
less than par, an even more obvious dilution device. See Otter v. Brevoort Petroleum Co.,
50 Barb. 247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1867). Unless shares reacquired from a deceased or retired par-
ticipant are to be automatically cancelled, which can be provided for in the certificate under
Article 4, if desired, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 515(a), the possibility of reissue pDses such a
danger to a minority that a requirement for unanimity seems clearly indicated.
37. This provision is designed to prevent the board from issuing options, etc., N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 505(a) or convertible bonds, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 519, without minority
approval, to prevent utilization of this subtle dilution device. See also Article 8, Section
2(K) and note 74 infra.
38. Plugs loophole created by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 516(a), under which the board can
reduce stated capital in certain instances without shareholder approval. Such a reduction
can create a surplus to be used as a squeeze-out device by payment of excessive dividends.
See O"Neal & Derwin § 4.12.
39. Dividends in cash may be a squeeze-out device. See O'Neal & Derwin § 5.14, at
135. The other limitations are complementary to those forbidding issuance of additional
securities. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 510(a). Since the failure to declare a dividend can
also be a squeeze-out device, O'Neal & Derwin § 3.04, it may be desirable to include a provi-
sion requiring the declaration of dividends where the corporation's financial condition malhes
such dividends possible. See note 93 infra. If such a mandatory dividend provision
is used, the words "other than as required by this Certificate of Incorporation" should, of
course, be added, at the end of this clause.
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mortgage, or pledge of, or creation of a security interest in or lien on,
any of the assets of the Corporation (whether before or after dissolution),
where the then market value of the asset sold, given, assigned, trans-
ferred, leased, exchanged, mortgaged, pledged, or in which a security
interest or lien is created exceeds $ ......... 40
(H) The authorization of any merger or consolidation of this Cor-
poration with any other Corporation, domestic or foreign, any plan for
any such merger or consolidation, or any contract which in effect con-
stitutes a merger or consolidation.41
(I) Any loan to, or agreement to guarantee, answer for, or indemnify
against, any act, debt, obligation, default or miscarriage of any person,
partnership, association or corporation, including this Corporation,
whether or not in furtherance of the corporate purposes of this Corpora-
tion.42
(J) Any resolution authorizing the making, execution, delivery, or
endorsement of any commercial paper the face amount of which exceeds
$ ........ , and any guaranty of any commercial paper regardless of
the face amount thereof.4
3
(K) Any resolution authorizing any contract or obligation which
creates a liability, certain or contingent, in excess of $ ......... 4-.
(L) The commencement of any action or proceeding (including the
submission of any claim to arbitration), against any person, corporation,
association or partnership, including any officer, director, employee or
shareholder of this Corporation.
45
40. The figure inserted here should be the same or less than that under Article 8,
Section 2(E). The figure set should be considered in conjunction with the figures used
for other contracts (Article 6, Section 9(j), (K)), and the provisions of Article 7, Section 3.
41. Plugs loophole through the "short merger" statute, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 905,
907(c). See O'Neal & Derwin § 4.05. Reference to a contract which in effect constitutes
a merger or consolidation, here and in Article 8, Section 2(D), may not be necessary In view
of the restrictions on "sales," see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 909; Article 6, Section 9(G);
Article 8, Section 2(E). The purpose, of course, is to prevent any "de facto" mergers.
See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1964) ; Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc.,
182 A.2d 22 (Del. Ch. 1962), aff'd, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1963). Compare Farris v.
Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
42. This provision, coupled with Article 8, Section 2(F) is designed to protect the
minority from possible losses due to guarantees of obligations of third parties, e.g., the
majority shareholder or a corporation in which he has an interest, plugging a possible
loophole through which the guarantee might be upheld as somehow in furtherance of the
corporation's purposes. See O'Neal & Derwin § 5.05, at 108. As to loans, see also note 78
infra.
43. The amount here should be the same as that in Article 7, Section 3.
44. See note 43 supra.
45. This provision, coupled with the denial of officer powers in Article 7, Section 3, will,
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(M) Any action, proceeding or the filing of any petition for the
bankruptcy, reorganization, or receivership of the Corporation; or, except
as otherwise expressly required by law, the presentation of any petition
for judicial dissolution of the Corporation. "
(N) The making of any election or the giving of any consent under
the United States Internal Revenue Code, or the tax statutes of any state,
and the termination, revocation or cancellation of any such election or
consent.
4 7
Section 10. Vote on Other Matters'4 -- The number of votes of di-
rectors that shall be necessary for the transaction of any business
(including any request under Article 4, Section 5, or Article 10, Section
3), other than that specified in Section 9 of this Article, shall be
( ........ ) (that number which most closely approximates ........
percent of the number of directors provided in the by-laws then in force
as the number of directors which this corporation shall have) .
Section 11. Action During Vacancy.r°--The board of directors shall
for the corporation, "overrule" Lasker v. Moreida, 33 Misc. 2d 343, 233 N.Y.S2d 16
(Sup. CL), aff'd mem., 19 App. Div. 2d 646, 241 N..S.2d 397 (2d Dep't 1963), in which
the director-president was held to have inherent power to commence suit in the corporation's
name against his co-participants (in the absence of a by-law provision forbidding him from
doing so), and because of a requirement for director unanimity for all action, could not be
forced by the other directors to discontinue the action. See also note 93 infra.
46. See note 53 infra. See also O'Neal & Derwdn §§ 4,69, .13, as to dangers guarded
against.
47. See note 75 infra.
43. Again, as with shareholder action, see note 77 infra, all director action can be
required to be unanimous. This increases the probability of deadlock, and, accordingly, a
lesser percentage should probably be required for matters not so vital as those set forth
in Section 9. Otherwise, a disproportionate power is given to a minority represented on the
board.
49. Unless the certificate fixes the number of directors, see note 25 supra, some alternate
in terms of a percentage will have to be used to avoid necc:Aity for amendment of the
certificate should the by-laws be amended to change the number of directors.
50. This form is based on 2 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 10.24 (19538), modified to
allow the corporation to do what is necessary to repurchase his shares w.,hen the vacancy
is created by death of a participant, and to allow normal corporate operations to continue
during this period.
This Article might also contain a provision fixing the place for mectings of the board,
although as indicated above in the introductory text, p. 547 supra, it may b, desirable
to leave this matter for the by-laws. A certificate provision might take the following form:
Section 12. Place of Meetings. All meetings, regular and special, of the directors of
this Corporation shall be held only within the State of New York, and only (within the
County of .......... ) (within the City of .......... ) (at the Corporation's office)
(at [exact address]).
One of the parenthetical provisions should be chosen.
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not pass any resolution or take any action whatsoever, other than such
as shall be necessary to comply with the provisions of this Certificate of
Incorporation relating to the repurchase of a deceased shareholder's
stock and the Corporate by-laws and any contract entered into consistent
therewith relating to such repurchase, while any vacancy for whatever
cause exists on the board, provided only that the ordinary salaries of
employees who are not shareholders or directors of the Corporation may
be paid, and contracts approved prior to such vacancy in conformity
with this Certificate of Incorporation and the by-laws of this Corpora-
tion may be performed in accordance with the terms thereof.
ARTICLE 7
Section 1. Election of Officers.1 -- This Corporation shall have such
officers as are provided for in the by-laws. All such officers, however,
shall be elected and removed only by the shareholders and only in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Article 8.
Section 2. Rights on Suspension. 2-No suspension by the board of
directors of any officer, whether with or without cause, shall operate
to deprive him of any salary, wages or other compensation, to which
he would otherwise be entitled under the by-laws or any contract of
employment with the Corporation.
Section 3. Powers. -- No officer of this Corporation shall possess any
Such a provision is complementary to that in Section 8 of this Article to ensure that
no meetings can be held without all participants. See note 32 supra.
It should be noted that, unlike the ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act, Optional § 39A
(1953), New York gives no authorization for separate consent of all directors as a
substitute for a meeting. Compare N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 708.
51. Officer status at an agreed compensation is one way of securing a desired return
from the investment in time and money in the corporation. A one man corporation will
only want the minimum number of officers, i.e., two, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 71S(e).
Other corporations may want more, e.g., officers from each faction. Since, if the suggested
Certificate provision is adopted, the by-laws can only be amended by unanimous share-
holder consent, Article 8, Section 2(I), any danger of a "freeze-out" by creation of more
offices, at salaries which will divert what would otherwise be corporate profits to those
chosen by the majority, is obviated, no danger is posed by leaving the matter of the number
of officers to the by-laws.
Whether proportional or equal control is desired, it can be more easily reflected on the
shareholder level than on the directorial one, hence the provision, permitted by N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 715(b), that all officers shall be elected by the shareholders.
52. Even though officers are elected by the shareholders they may be suspended by the
board. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 716(a). This provision helps to discourage such suspension.
See also Article 8, Section 2(B) requiring unanimity for removal of an officer, the only
way of protecting an officer's contract rights where the removal is for "cause."
53. It is, of course, possible to give very broad powers to the participants in their
capacity as "officers." Ordinarily, the grant of such powers is dangerous. See Lasker v.
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power whatsoever, unless expressly authorized to act in the particular
matter as hereinafter provided in Article 8, except that (any officer)
(the president, etc.) shall have power, without prior approval of the
board of directors, to make, execute, deliver or endorse ( but not make
any guaranty of) any commercial paper the face amount of which does
not exceed $ ........ , and shall have the further power to enter into
contracts of purchase or sale in behalf of the Corporation where the
liability incurred under any such purchase contract does not exceed
the sum of $ ........ , and the value of the property sold does not
exceed $ .........
Section 4. Engaging in Other Business.2-No officer of this Corpora-
tion shall become a director, officer or employee of any other corpora-
tion, or association, nor a partner in any partnership, without the express
approval of the shareholders as hereinafter provided in Article S. The
office of any officer violating this provision shall immediately become
vacant, and all shares of stock in this Corporation held by him shall im-
mediately be offered for repurchase by the Corporation at the lesser of the
amount fixed in the by-laws pursuant to Section 4 of Article 4 of this
Certificate or (par) ($ ........ ).
ARTICLE 8
Section 1. Quorum of Shareholders.Yi--The presence in person or by
proxy of all of the holders of the Common stock of this Corporation
shall be necessary in order to constitute a quorum for the transaction
of any business at any meeting of the shareholders of this Corporation.
Section 2. High Vote Requirement.Y--The affirmative vote or con-
sent of all57 of the shareholders of the Common stock of this Corpora-
Moreida, 38 Misc. 2d 348, 23S N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. 19631, aff'd mem., 19 App. Div. 2d 646,
241 X.Y.S.2d 397 (2d Dep't 1963). Such a limitation as that proposed may bind third partiez.
See N. A. Bervin & Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co., 199 App. Div. 453, 191 XNY3. 317 (Ist
Dep't 1922), aff'd per curiam, 235 N.Y. 603, 139 N.E. 754 (1923). See generally, 19 C.J.S.
Corporations §§ 993, 997 (1940). Exceptions for small contracts are, of course, desirable, E og,
even the mustard man in the incorporated hot-dog stand may want to be able to order
a fresh supply of condiments.
54. See note 31 supra.
55. This provision is permitted by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 616(a)(1), and must be in
the certificate to be effective.
56. This provision too is authorized by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 616 and must be in
the certificate to be effective.
57. A percentage or fraction may be substituted instead. If one is used, it mut, of
course, be carefully chosen, to reflect the agreed upon control arrangement. For adequate
protection of a minority interest probably the entire list of provisions in this section
should, however, require unanimity.
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tion, regardless of class, shall be necessary for the transaction of the
following items of business:
(A) The election58 or, except as provided in Section 7 of Article 6 of
this Certificate, the removal (with" or without cause)"' of any director,
regardless of which class has elected him, and the filling of any vacancy
on the board however created.6'
(B) The appointment or, except as provided in Section 4 of Article 7
of this Certificate, the removal (with or without cause) of any officer. -02
58. This provision will implement a shareholder's agreement to elect the participants and
keep them in office. Where the agreement does not include all of the participants, as, of
course, it need not, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(a), the words "election or" should be deleted.
Removal should still probably require unanimity (at least for removal without cause), unless
dummies are to be used on the board to secure proportionality of representation. It should
be noted that where more than a plurality of votes of a class is required to elect a
director, one-third of the shareholders entitled to vote for voluntary dissolution (ordinarily
the shares entitled to vote for directors and those entitled to vote for dissolution will be
the same) cannot be prevented from filing a petition for judicial dissolution if a deadlock
develops or "there is internal dissension and two or more factions of shareholders are
so divided that dissolution would be beneficial to the shareholders." N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 1104(a)(3). See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1104(b). If the shares are classified as above
suggested with each participant receiving at least a majority of a class, it would seem
unnecessary to require more than a plurality, and thus possible to prevent presentation of
any petition for judicial dissolution under this section and N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1104(c)
(petition where a failure to elect directors for two years), while still achieving the same
guarantee of board representation. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 614(a), 617(b), 703(a). In
order to do so, however, all requirements for more than a majority vote of the board
(Article 6, Sections 9 and 10) must also be deleted. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1104(b). Since
this will ordinarily be dangerous to the minority, it will be impossible to absolutely prohibit
the filing of a petition for dissolution unless all power is withdrawn from the board by a
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b) provision.
It is desirable for the participants themselves, in advance of any dispute which may
later arise, to determine the circumstances under which they will want their corporate
venture to terminate, rather than leave this decision to a court. Manifestly, the best
contrived control arrangement is of no value if a participant can "opt-out" any time he
wants by dissolving the corporation, or use the threat of dissolution for extorting con-
cessions from his co-participants. Accordingly, provisions have been added in this Article
(Section 2(G) and (H)), and Article 6 (Section 9(M)) to plug this loophole so far as
possible. Since some fair escape device is necessary to avoid complete paralysis and conse-
quent business failure, should a serious and continued rift eventuate, a separate Article
has been added dealing with this subject (Article 9).
59. Plugs loophole in N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 706(a), allowing removal for cause by
vote of shareholders, and prevents enactment of a by-law allowing directors to remove a
fellow director. See also note 28 supra.
60. Plugs loophole in N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 706(b), allowing shareholders to enact a
by-law providing for removal of directors without cause.
61. It should be noted that this clause, Section 2(A), should be omitted entirely if the
alternate provisions for Article 6, Section 3 and 4 are utilized. See note 27 supra.
62. Article 7, Section 1 provides, as allowed by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 715(b), for dec-
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(C) The fixing of the compensation (of whatever form, direct or indi-
rect, and whether paid to said director or officer or to a third party) and
duties, and any changes therein, of any director or officer; and the grant-
ing of permission to any director or officer to become a director, officer
or employee of any other corporation or a partner in any partnership.1'
(D) Any merger or consolidation of the Corporation with any other
corporation, domestic or foreign, and any contract which in effect con-
stitutes a merger or consolidation. 4
(E) Any sale, gift, assignment or other transfer of, lease, exchange,
mortgage or pledge of, or creation of a security interest in or lien on,
any of the assets of the Corporation (whether before or after dissolu-
tion),11 where the then market value of the asset sold, given, assigned,
transferred, leased, exchanged, mortgaged, pledged, or in which a
security interest or lien is created exceeds $ .........
tion of officers by the shareholders. This itself plugs a loophole in N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 716(a), which allows board-appointed officers to be removed with or without cause by
the directors. A unanimity requirement will also prevent removal of a shareholder-officer
even by the shareholders. Having the officers elected by the shareholders will prevent pozi-
ble unenforceability of such a typical shareholder agreement provision as that in McQuade
v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 1S9 N.E. 234 (1934), wherein the participants agreed to act
(as directors) to keep certain persons as officers at stated salaries. See also, krmel:, Corporate
Practice 377-73 (1963).
63. Plugs a loophole, permitted by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law., § 713(c), for diverJon of
corporate profits to participants who are directors from thoze who are only shareholders,
and not also directors. See also note 31 supra. The parenthetical matter is deigned to
insure that all forms of compensation, e.g., pensions, bonuses, widov's bentefi etc., will
require the same shareholder approval (See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Lawv § 202(a)(13). As to
death benefits, see Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101(b). Where the financial condition of the
corporation justifies it, such special compensation plans should, of courze, b conidered
and given advance authorization.
64. Plugs a loophole created by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 901, 903(a)(2), 907(a), (b),
whereby two-thirds of the outstanding voting shares may authorize a merger or con-
solidation. As to the dangers from a merger or consolidation, see O'Neal & Dervin §§ 4.05,
.06, .07. See also Article 6, Section 9(H) plugging the loophole whereby the directors
may merge or consolidate without shareholder approval under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 05,
907(c).
65. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 1005(a)(3)(A), 1006(a)(2). The provision are
designed to insure that a minority will still be able to exercise its veto to prevent a liquida-
tion sale at which the price will be unfair to it. As to dangers from such a liquidation -ale,
see O"Neal & Derwin §§ 4.09, .10, .11.
66. Plugs loopholes created under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ M09, 911, whereby the
directors can mortgage or pledge any or all property, and can sell, lease or exchange any
corporate property unless the latter disposition both amounts to "all or substantially all
the assets of the corporation," and the sale, lease or exchange is "not made in the uzual
or regular course of the business actually conducted." There is no express authorization
to limit the right of sale, lease or exchange except as provided in § 9G9 (requiring two-
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(F) Any guaranty not in furtherance of the corporate purposes.'
(G) Non-judicial dissolution of the Corporation, except as otherwise
specified in Article 9.1'
(H) Except as otherwise expressly required by law, the presentation
of any petition for judicial dissolution of the Corporation."'
(I) Any amendment of the by-laws (including, but without limitation
thereto, any change in the number of directors,70 or officers, and any
change in the price fixed pursuant to Articles 4 and 9 of this Certificate for
its shares of stock) of this Corporation."
(J) Any amendment of or change in this certificate of incorporation12
thirds of the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, where these two conditions are met).
Such a limitation might, accordingly, be considered improperly restrictive of the powers of
the board, a N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b) provision. In order to avoid such an interpreta-
tion a corresponding (unanimity) provision is inserted in the Director portion of the
certificate. See Article 6, Section 9(G). There would seem to be no objection to a restriction
which requires shareholder approval of directorial action even without a special § 620(b)
provision. See Ripley v. Storer, 1 Misc. 2d 281, 139 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
mem., 286 App. Div. 844, 142 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1st Dep't 1955), modified on other grounds, 309
N.Y. 506, 132 N.E.2d 87 (1956). Thus, the restriction here should be unobjectionable.
To avoid any possibility that this provision might be considered a § 620(b) provision,
the clause could be divided into two parts as follows:
Any sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of
the Corporation, unless made in the usual course of the business actually conducted by the
Corporation.
Any mortgage or pledge of, or the creation of any security interest in or lien on, any
part of the Corporation's property or any interest therein, wherever situated, except as
otherwise provided in Article 6, Section 9(G).
These practically copy the language of the respective statutes involved, N.Y. Bus. Corp.
Law §§ 909, 911. Presumably, more than the "two-thirds of all outstanding shares" required
by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 909(a)(3), is permissible.
Manifestly, for protection against sales, etc., of less than "substantially all" of the corpo-
rate assets (and even for sales of all if in the regular course of business), where this
modified provision is used, the requirement of board unanimity, Article 6, Section 9(G),
must be relied upon to protect the minority.
67. Plugs a loophole created by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 908 which allows two-thirds
of the shareholders to give a guaranty even though not in furtherance of the corporation's
purposes, e.g., of the personal obligation of a major participant.
68. Designed to plug a loophole created by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1001 which allows
two-thirds of the outstanding shares entitled to vote thereon to dissolve the corporation.
As to the dangers from such dissolution see O'Neal & Derwin § 4.09. See also note 58 supra.
If no special provision for dissolution is to be included in the certificate, the phrase after the
comma should be deleted, and a period substituted for the comma.
69. Designed to plug loopholes created by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1103, and to the
extent possible, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1104. See also note 58 supra.
70. See Article 6, Section 1.
71. This provision is vital to prevent an alteration of the agreed upon control structure.
72. See note 71 supra.
It might be desirable here to expressly provide that no shareholder approval will be
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including (excluding)"a changes in the location of the Corporation's
office, the post office address to which the secretary of state shall mail a
copy of any process against the Corporation served upon him, and any
appointment, revocation or change in the designation of a registered
agent or his or its address.
(K) The issuance of any rights or options to purchase, and the is-
suance of any securities convertible into, shares of the Corporation,
whether under a plan or otherwise, and to whomsoever issued. 4
(L) The making of any election or the giving of any consent under
the United States Internal Revenue Code, or the tax statutes of any
state, and the termination, revocation or cancellation of any such election
or consent.
75
(M) Any amendment which adds to, strikes out, or changes in any
way, any of the provisions of this Article, or any of the provisions of
Article 6, or Article 9.11
required for a reduction of stated capital necessary to meet the corporation's obligation
to repurchase the shares of, at least, deceased shareholders, since such a capital reduction
may be required to produce a surplus for such repurchase. The provision might taize the
following form:
provided that all the then shareholders shall be deemed to have unanimously consented
to any pro rata reduction of the stated capital, including any reduction in the par .Aue
of shares with par value, of all shares of the common stock then outstanding, including
the shares of the decedent, necessary to permit the Corporation to carry out it6 obligations
under Article 4, Section 6 of this Certificate.
73. The changes which follow are probably not important enough to require unanimity
as opposed to the board approval allowed under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § S03(b). In order
to avoid ambiguity, however, the certificate should be specific as to whether or not such
changes are to require the same shareholder approval as other more important matters.
Clearly, either "including" or "excluding" should be used in accordance with this choice.
It should be remembered that if excluded here, the changes vill be made as authorized
by the board under Article 6, Section 10, unless added to Section 9.
74. Plugs loopholes under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 505, 519(b), which otherwie can
be used to dilute a participant's financial and control interest.
75. This provision is designed to cover such tax elections as that under Subchapter S
of the Internal Revenue Code. Although all shareholders must consent to an election, any-
how, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-2(a) (1959), the provision may have some utility in
preventing a later revocation or termination. See, e.g., Treas, Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(1)(iil),
(2) (1959); Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-5(a) (1959). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.565-1 (1953) (con-
sent dividends); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-1, -12 (1955) (consolidated returns).
The reference to state tax statutes will cover any possible amendment to the New York
statutes, such as that found in some states, see, e.g., VL Stats. Ann. § 32-6101, allowing
an election on the state level similar to Subchapter S.
76. This provision is necessary to plug loopholes in N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 616tb),
709(b), under which two-thirds of the shareholders can amend or strike out a high vote
requirement, see Hoffman, New Horizons for the Close Corporation in New York Under
Its New Business Corporation Law, 28 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 5 (1961), and to be explicit
as to the vote required to amend a special dissolution provision under N.Y. Bus. Corp,
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Section 3. Vote on Other Matters.7 -The proportion of affirmative
votes or consents of the holders of shares necessary for the transaction
of any business, other than that specified in Section 2 of this Article,
shall be ........ percent of the outstanding shares of the Common
stock of this Corporation.
Section 4. Loans to Directors. 7 -Notwithstanding any of the foregoing
Law § 1002(b). Of course, if no special provision for dissolution is included, the reference
to Article 9 should be omitted.
Other provisions can, of course, be added. For example, if any of the shares of the
corporation are to be no-par, a provision like that in Article 6, Section 9(C) should be
added here, since under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 504(d), the consideration for such shares
can be fixed-by the shareholders. It should be observed that N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 504(c),
gives no such option in the case of par value shares Retention by the shareholders of
the power to fix the consideration of no-par shares, also can prevent reduction of tile
stated capital of such shares by the board. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 516(a).
77. If unanimity, or the same high vote, is to be required for all shareholder action,
Section 2 may be eliminated entirely, and only this section (renumbered, and omitting
the reference to Section 2) utilized. The high vote need not, of course, give a veto.
For example, in a corporation with five equal participants, it may be decided to require
the concurrence of two to prevent a decision. Thus, a vote of 61% would be required
for shareholder decisions. In order to minimize the danger of deadlock, where unanimity
is required for the fundamental changes set out in Section 2, it may well be decided to
require a percentage less than the equivalent of all, perhaps even a mere majority, to
control in less significant areas.
Where the shares are classified the provision may be amended to read:
........ percent of the outstanding Class A stock, plus ........ percent of the outstanding
Class B stock, plus ........ percent of the outstanding Class C stock of this Corporation.
As a further alternative, the provision might read:
........ percent of the total outstanding Common Stock, regardless of class, of this
Corporation.
It should be observed that these two provisions may prove different. Thus, in a three-
man corporation in which the financial contributions are equal, a 667o requirement for each
of three classes will guarantee each a veto, a 66% over-all (total) requirement will not.
In order to avoid any question of meeting the requirements of Subchapter S, see Treas.
Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1959), the over-all percentage high enough to give a veto, if desired,
is preferable. E.g., 67% over-all in the example will guarantee the veto, and dearly not
disqualify the corporation.
If the shares are to be treated as all of the same class for all purposes other than election
of directors, see note 10 supra, no special provision would seem necessary, even If the
shares are classified, i.e., the provision in the Certificate should be sufficient.
A provision similar to that discussed in note 50 supra for directors' meetings might
here be inserted, with the section number changed to "4," and the word "shareholders"
substituted for "directors."
78. Loans to participants pose a special problem. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 714 provides:
A loan shall not be made by a corporation to any director unless it is authorized by vote
of the shareholders. For this purpose, the shares of the director who would be the borrower
shall not be shares entitled to vote. A loan made in violation of this section shall be a
violation of the duty to the corporation of the directors approving it, but the obligation
of the borrower with respect to the loan shall not be affected thereby.
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provisions of this Article, and any other provision of this Certificate of
Incorporation, the quorum shall consist of, and the affirmative vote or
consent of the holders of all of the outstanding shares of the Common
stock of this Corporation, excluding said director, shall be necessary to
approve any loan to any director of this Corporation.
ARTICLE 97
0
In the event that such written offer is not accepted in writing accom-
panied by full payment in cash or, at the election of the purchaser or
Accordingly, any loans made to participants who are directors will require approval by
a majority of the shares voting at a shareholder meeting. Presumably, the shares of the
director may not even be counted towards a quorum, since they are not "entitled to vote
thereat." N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 60S (a). Accordingly, the statute itself may be sufficient
protection against improvident loans. See also N.Y. Pen. Law § 664(4).
If it is not, as e.g., where the borrowing director has only a few shares, but has a
relative or friend with a large number, some special provision should be made under a
separate section unless the general percentage chosen for shareholder action under Section 2
is sufficient for adequate protection.
Requiring unanimous shareholder consent under Section 2 of this Article might con-
ceivably be construed to prevent any such loan, since by the terms of X.Y. 13u:. Corp.
Law § 714 it could never properly be given. (Presumably, an exception to the quorum
requirement of Section 1 would also have to be made to avoid ambiguity).
79. Any veto arrangement such as found in Articles 6 and S increases the danger
of deadlock and consequent corporate paralysis. Some fair method of resolving the dead-
lock must be utilized. Since, as indicated above, dissolution can be a squeeze-out device,
it is best to condition its availability in a manner which will ensure its use only as a final
resort, and only under circumstances where all parties will be fairly treated. N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 1002 gives the participants a certain degee of flexibility in determining
when their corporation will be dissolved. It provides:
(a) The certificate of incorporation may contain a provision that any shareholder,
or the holders of any specified number or proportion of shares, or of any specified number
or proportion of shares of any class or series thereof, may require the dissolution of the
corporation at will or upon the occurrence of a specified event.
Presumably an arbitrator's decision might be the "specified event." See Kesler, Arbitra-
tion of Intra-Corporate Disputes Under New York Laws, 19 Arb. J. (ns.) 1, 11-15, 85,
91-2, 96 (1964). It might also be failure of the corporation or other shareholders to
accept a "double offer" (shareholder offers to buy out others or be bought out at a price
he sets).
Where class election of directors is not used, dissolution might be made automatic,
i.e., by allowing any shareholder to dissolve, where the statutory ground for a patition,
failure to elect replacement directors for 2 years, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 11041c), has
been met.
The form drafted provides for dissolution by any shareholder who is not brought out at
a certain per cent of the price which he would receive on death (fixed in the by-laws
pursuant to Article 4, Section 6). The percentage should, of course, be lecs than 100.
Otherwise, a participant can use the threat of dissolution to extort unfair conces ons,
since, because the redemption price should be the full value, he will have nothing to lose
by dissolution. (The best-outside-offer provision of Article 4, Section 4 could also be
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purchasers as the case may be, a down payment of 30 per cent of the
selling price,80 and a note providing for payment in equal installments,
without interest, over a period of ........ months, with acceleration
of the entire obligation in the event of nonpayment of any installment
when due, by the Corporation, or the other shareholders in proportion
to their then shareholdings in the Corporation, or by one or more of said
shareholders with the consent of all other shareholders excluding the
shareholder making said offer, (through payment therefor in cash)
within 30 days after the mailing of said offer, any shareholder (including
the estate of a deceased shareholder) making a written offer, for accept-
ance first by the Corporation and then by the shareholders in the manner
aforesaid on condition that the Corporation not accept, to sell all of his
shares (of all classes) in the Corporation at a price which shall be not
more than ........ per cent of the price fixed in the by-laws of this
Corporation for a redemption pursuant to Article 4, Section 6 of this
Certificate, may, at any time after the elapse of 30 days, but not more
than 60 days thereafter, from the mailing, registered mail return receipt
requested, of said offer to the Corporation and all of said shareholders
(or after 30 days, and not more than 60 days, following the last of such
mailings, if not all mailed on the same day, but, in no event, later than
100 days after the first such mailing), dissolve the Corporation by
signing, verifying and delivering a certificate of dissolution to the de-
partment of state.
Except as otherwise expressly required by law, this Corporation shall
not be dissolved except as provided in this Article and in Articles 6 and
8 of this Certificate.
rendered nugatory, since a shareholder could force payment of the full amount fixed
in the by-laws or dissolve, even though as will be typical where the corporation or other
shareholders are unwilling or incapable of repurchasing at the price fixed, the best-outside-
offer would be less.) A figure of, say, 75% of the fixed price (or its alternate, see note 15
supra) might be about right to discourage a participant from forcing a buy-out in the
heat of a minor argument, while not being so low as to force a participant to "stay in"
when the conflict with his co-participants has become deep-seated. It should be observed
that a discontented participant has another "out" if the corporation is really prosperous:
he can still sell to an outsider at a higher price unless the corporation or other share-
holders buy him out under Article 4, Section 4. For an alternative "dissolution on failure
to buy-out" provision, see 2 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 10.28 (1958).
80. This payment provision is designed to take advantage of Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 453(b)(2)(A)(ii) so that the shareholder being bought out need only pay a tax on
the payments as received.
It will also prevent the minority holder from using dissolution to squeeze out his co-
participants by making his offer at a time when he knows they will not have enough
cash to pay him off in full. Similar payment provisions can be added under Article 4,
or, as suggested, left for the by-laws in connection with such sales, and redemptions.
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ARTICLE 1Is
Section 1. Effect of Tax Elections on Share Transfcrs.-Notwith-
standing any of the foregoing provisions of this Certificate of Incorpora-
tion, in the event that this Corporation and the shareholders thereof
make any tax election under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, or the
tax laws of any state, no shareholder shall make any disposition of any
of his shares whether inter vivos or upon death, and whether by way
of sale, gift, bequest, assignment, transfer, mortgage, hypothecation,
encumbrance, pledge, creation of a security interest in or lien on, trust
(voting or other), or any other means whatsoever, the effect of which
is or may be to terminate any such election. Any such disposition shall
be void, shall not be recorded on the books of the Corporation, and
shall not entitle the holder to any rights of a shareholder whatsoever.
Section 2. Deceased Shareholders. 2-In the event of the death of
81. The purpose of this Article is to protect a Subchapter S tax election from termina-
tion. Such a termination is a possible squeeze-out device. See O'Neal & Derwin § 5.12;
O'Neal, Close Corporations § 2.04(f) (Supp. 1963). There are a number of ways in vhich
an election may be terminated, automatically, and unfortunately unilaterally, by a partici-
pant. An obvious means is for a shareholder to give away a sufficient number of shares
so that the total number of shareholders becomes eleven. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§§ 1371(a), 1372(e)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(3) (1959).
Even though the number of shareholders remains less than eleven, termination may
be achieved by a transfer to a nonresident alien or, if one is not handy, to any individual
who does not consent to the election. Transfer to other than individuals, e.,g., to corpora-
tions, partnerships or trusts, will have the same effect. lbid. An exception is made for an
estate, i.e., such a transfer to a non-individual will not terminate the election, unles
the representative fails to consent within the time limit. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-3(b) (1959).
The biggest loopholes are, of course, gifts, and, for shareholders who want to retain
full ownership rights, transfers to a voting trust, of which there is nothing, under prezent
law, to prevent the "former owner" from being trustee. It should also be noted that the
voting trust no longer has the disadvantage which formerly discouraged its use: it
need not be open to the other shareholders. McKinney's Business Corporation Law § 621
& Comment (1963). Any transfer in trust, including one to a voting trust, vilt auto-
matically terminate the election. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(e) (1959). Berauze the pos-
sibility of such transfers is often forgotten in drafting share transfer restrictions, this
device especially may prove a very dangerous loophole.
The purpose of Section 1 is, of course, to prevent any such transfer. If Article 4,
Section 4 is inserted as drafted, it should be noted that this section of Article 9 will
only come into play if the participants fail to repurchase the outgoing shareholder's hares.
Nonetheless, the danger is worth guarding against. The provisions of Section 1 should
prevent a loss of the election even when the participants vaive their rights under the
other repurchase provisions of the Certificate. As will be discussed in the following note,
the principal danger of termination, even under carefully drafted share repurchase pro-
visions, will, however, come from the death of a participant.
82. Obviously, transfers by death cannot be prevented. Article 4, Section 6, provides
for repurchase of the deceased's shares. It cannot, however, prevent Subehapter S termina-
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any shareholder, unless termination of such election both can be and
is prevented by action of the personal representative of the deceased, the
price to be paid by the Corporation, under Article 4, Section 6, of this
Certificate of Incorporation, for each of the shares of such deceased
shareholder shall be the lesser of the amount fixed in the by-laws or
(par) ($ ........ ), and the estate and all beneficiaries thereunder shall
be bound to transfer all of said shares to the Corporation at said price
per share.
Section 3. Involuntary Transfers.83-Any person who becomes the
holder or possessor of any shares, or share certificates, of this Corpora-
tion by virtue of any judicial process, attachment, bankruptcy, receiver-
ship, execution or judicial sale, shall take whatever action is necessary
to prevent a termination of said election, and in the event that such
termination nonetheless takes place, whether due to the fault of, or
without the fault of, said holder or possessor, the price to be paid by
the Corporation under Article 4, Section 5, of this Certificate of Incor-
tion through failure of the executor or administrator to consent to the election. A new
shareholder has 30 days to file a consent to the election. Treas. Reg. 1.1372-3(b) (1959)
further provides: "If the new shareholder is an estate, the 30-day period shall not begin
until the executor or administrator has qualified under local law to perform his duties, but
in no event shall such period begin later than 30 days following the close of the corporation's
taxable year in which the estate became a shareholder."
If the executor or administrator fails to act within the 30 days the election terminates.
Treas. Reg. 1.1372-4(b)(1) (1959). Although the contractual obligation of the corpora-
tion to purchase and the estate to sell might well be properly interpreted to revest the
stock in the corporation immediately on death, precluding the estate from ever becoming
a shareholder, the Regulations are silent on the subject, and, hence, until an actual ex-
change of cash (or notes) for certificates takes place, the estate will probably be regarded
as a "new shareholder," and hence entitled to terminate the election. A shareholder
agreement among the parties should require each to execute a will and insert an appropri-
ate direction in it ordering the executor to file a timely consent. Neither the enforce-
ability of such an agreement nor such a provision in a will seems to have been the
subject of any judicial opinion, yet. However, a provision voiding any transfer to an
estate upon failure of the personal representative to execute the necessary consent would
seem to smack too much of a forfeiture for courts to uphold it. Whence, the provision
for a reduced payment to the estate upon failure to comply. Payment of only par, even
though the value of the stock has appreciated considerably, should be an enforceable
penalty, see Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d
418 (1957), and perhaps even a smaller set dollar amount will be, and should be a
sufficient inducement to the personal representative to execute the necessary consent. The
certificate provision should also provide him with sufficient justification should any of
the beneficiaries later challenge his action for some reason.
83. This provision is designed to prevent the loss of an election through an involuntary
transfer of the shares of a participant. Again, as with death, such transfers cannot be
absolutely prevented, although the dangers are already diminished by the provisions for-
bidding pledge, etc. Article 10, Section 1; Article 4, Section 4.
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poration, for each of such shares so held or possessed shall be the lesser
of the amount fixed in the by-laws or (par) ($ ........ ), and the said
holder or possessor shall be bound to transfer all of said shares to the
Corporation at said price per share, whenever requested by the Board
of Directors so to do.
Section 4. Effect of Cancellation of Termination.6 -The fact that
the appropriate tax authorities revoke the termination, or allow a re-
election, shall not affect the obligation of the Corporation to pay no
more than the minimum amount provided for under Section 2 or Section
3 of this Article, nor validate any disposition or transfer prohibited by
Section 1 of this Article.
ARTICLE 11
No shares of this Corporation shall be deemed properly issued, and
no shares shall be transferred upon the books of the Corporation, nor
shall any holder thereof be entitled to any rights of a shareholder,
unless the certificate, or certificates, evidencing said shares bear con-
spicuously"0 on the face or back thereof the following notice:
"Transfer of these shares is restricted by provisions contained in
Articles 4, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of the Certificate of Incorporation and the
by-laws of this Corporation,"7 which also fix the value of said shares.
84. The district director has the power, under certain circumstances, to extend the
time for filing a consent, Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-3(c) (1959), and the Commissioner has
power to allow a re-election even though the five-year period of disqualification or-
dinarily incident to a termination, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1372(f), has not eOap:ed,
Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-5 (1959). The purpose of this section of the Certificate is to make
it clear that the burden of preserving the tax election will not be on the remaining par-
ticipants, and that, accordingly, once a termination has taken place the person bringing
it about will not be entitled to claim a higher value for the shares (although, of course,
the other shareholders may unanimously grant it), merely because it has somehow been
possible to save the election or reinstate it.
85. This article plugs a loophole which would otherwise allow the majority of direc-
tors to issue share certificates without the required notices, and thus render the control
arrangement ineffective, perhaps absolutely, and at least as against persons without actual
notice of the provisions. See Tomoser v. Kamphausen, 307 N.Y. 797, 121 N.E.2d 622 (1954);
Boornazian v. Sarkisian, 110 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
86. See New York Uniform Commercial Code § S-204; N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 616(c),
620(g), 709(c), 1002(c).
87. Required by New York Uniform Commercial Code § S-204, which provides: "Un-
less noted conspicuously on the security a restriction on transfer imposed by the issuer
even though otherwise lawful is ineffective except against a person with actual kmowledge
of it." Reasonable by-law restrictions are valid, i.e., even though not set out in the
certificate of incorporation, under Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141
N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957). "Issued subject to restrictions in Scctions 23, 29
and 39 of the By-laws" was held therein to be sufficient notice to comply with old
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Article 8 of the Certificate of Incorporation requires the presence in
person or by proxy of a greater proportion of shareholders, and the
affirmative vote of a greater proportion of shareholders for shareholder
action than would otherwise be required by law.88 Article 6 of the
Certificate of Incorporation requires the presence of a greater number
of directors and the affirmative vote of a greater number of directors
for director action than would otherwise be required by law. 8 Articles
6 and 7 of the Certificate of Incorporation limits the powers of directors
and officers." Article 9 of the Certificate of Incorporation contains
provisions allowing any shareholder under certain circumstances to dis-
solve the Corporation.9 The Certificate of Incorporation and by-laws
of this Corporation contain other provisions specially regulating the
operation of this Corporation and the rights, duties and powers of its
shareholders, directors, officers and employees, all of which provisions
are binding on the shareholders, directors, officers, employees and third
parties dealing with the Corporation, and all persons are cautioned to
familiarize themselves with all such provisions. 2 The Corporation will
furnish to any shareholder upon request and without charge, a full
statement of the designation, relative rights, preferences and limitations
of the shares of each class of shares which the Corporation is authorized
to issue."93
Personal Property Law § 176 (Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 15), and should be
under the Uniform Commercial Code, also.
88. Required by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 616(c).
89. Required by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 709(c).
90. Although not specifically required by statute, the provision should bolster en-
forceability and forestall any argument that any of the provisions of the certificate
improperly restrict the power of directors and hence must be referred to under N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 620(g).
91. Required by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1002(c).
92. See note 90 supra.
93. Required where the corporation is authorized to issue shares of different classes.
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 508(b).
Other provisions can, of course, be added. In fact, any provision proper for the by-laws
can be inserted. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(b). This manifestly leaves considerable
leeway. Arbitration provisions might well be added in a separate article here. If they are,
Article 6, Section 9(L), should be modified accordingly.
Since the right to examine corporate records, except the shareholder list and minutes
of shareholder meetings, are apparently still left to common law formulation, see N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 624(f), there would seem to be no objection to broadening the right if
desired. O'Neal suggests such a broadening. 1 ONeal, Close Corporations § 3.63 (1958);
for form, see 2 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 10.28, at 284 (1958). Such provisions may,
however, prove dangerous. See Slay v. Polonia Publishing Co., 249 Mich. 609, 229 N.W.
434 (1930).
Provisions compelling declaration of dividends when the corporation's financial condi-
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-::[Type name as signed]"4
Incorporator
-[Address, including street and number,
municipality and state]
tion justifies them might also be added. For a possible form, see 2 O'Neal, CloZe Corpora-
tions § 10.22 (1958). The following might also be used:
Annual dividends on the common stock will be declared by the Corporation as follows:
the total dividend shall be $.... payable out of the accumulated earned surplus in
excess of $. If 50% of the annual net profits after taxes exceed the minimum $....,
then the directors, by vote in accordance with Article 6 of this certificate, shall have
discretion to declare a dividend up to 505 of the annual net profit. If the net profits
are less than $..... nevertheless the minimum dividend shall be declared providing the
$.... accumulated earned surplus is maintained. 'Earned surplus' shall have the meaning
given to it by the Business Corporation Law, or any amendment thereto.
This form is modified from Galler v. Galler, - Ill.-, 203 N.E2d 577 (1964), wherein
it was upheld.
Where any provisions authorized by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b) are utilized (at-
tempts have been intentionally made to avoid such provisions), the share certificates,
and, accordingly, the provisions required by Article 11 should include the following:
The Certificate of Incorporation also contains provisions, as authorized by § 6Z0(b) of
the Business Corporation Law, restricting the discretion and powers of the board of
directors of this Corporation in its management of corporate affairs.
Because many of the provisions of this certificate are novel, it might be well to add
a "severability clause." The following might be used:
Article ......
If any provision of this Certificate or the application thereof to any person or cir-
cumstances is held invalid, such invralidity shall not affect other provisions or applicatiom
of this Certificate which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application,
and to this end the provisions of this Certificate are declared severable.
This provision is practically copied from the severability clause of the Businccs Corpora-
tion Law itself. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 111. It should relieve the Secretary of State
from any responsibility for filing a certificate which in some respect exceed- the power3
granted by the statute to corporations, and accordingly may result in the filing of cer-
tificates which might otherwise be returned for including provisions in the penumbral
zone between the clearly authorized and the clearly prohibited. The danger inherent in
any severability clause, however, is that after the judicial excision of any invalid provi-
sion the remaining ones may possibly provide a useful squeeze-out device for a participant
who wants to escape from his bargain.
94. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(a) requires that the certificate "be signed by each
incorporator, with his name and address stated beneath or opposite his signature .... "
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 104(b) defines address to "include the street and number, or
other particular description instead of a street and number.' Although it can be argued
that, by virtue of the exception contained therein, § 104(d) does not require a statement
of the capacity in which the signer signs, it is simpler to include the capacity ("in-
corporator") in which the person signs, than risk any questioning of the proper execution
of the certificate.
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*State of ....................
County of ..................
On the ........ day of ............. 19 ... , before me personally
came [name of incorporator], to me known to be the person described
in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that
he executed the same.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ° o . . °. . . . . .
[Type name as signed]
Notary Public
95. The certificate must be acknowledged. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402 (a).
